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Chapter 1: Introduction
An operating system (OS) provides a set of abstractions through which access
to hardware resources may be granted or multiplexed (virtualized). The design of
this set of abstractions is informed by performance, isolation/security, portability,
and ease of use constraints. These constraints are often at tension with one an-
other. For instance, maximizing performance, whether it be throughput or latency,
and simultaneously maximizing security is difficult if not impossible. Security is
typically provided by isolating actors on the system and their data from one an-
other, yet crossing isolation boundaries has a performance cost, which implies an
inherent trade-off between performance and security. Similarly, portability, the fea-
ture whereby programs can run with little to no modification on different hardware,
OS versions, or even different OSes that maintain compatibility, is also at odds with
performance and, in some cases, security. Each significant branch of OS architec-
ture discussed below effectively chooses abstractions that impose different priority
orderings of these constraints and impose these trade-offs on users. The question
we ask is not which OS architecture offers the best abstractions, but rather whether
an OS ought to be constrained to a fixed set of abstractions at all.
OSes are often designed to favor one constraint over others. An OS that fa-
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vors performance above all else will offer abstractions that give direct or near-direct
access to hardware. At the extreme, no OS (or just the hardware interface) is the
best OS for performance. The abstractions offered in this case (i.e., the hardware
interfaces) impose no overhead or unnecessary abstractions that may inhibit perfor-
mance, but suffer from three drawbacks: they are non-portable, offer little isolation,
and rarely provide a virtualized hardware interface to enable resource sharing. OSes
that favor isolation and security will limit the amount of software that runs with ele-
vated privileges and separate as many components as possible into separate domains
that may only interact through some supervisory process. In addition to security,
isolation may also be used to improve the robustness of the system: the effects of a
fault may more easily be contained to the isolated domain, which simplifies recovery.
Kernels that prioritize isolation may or may not be portable, but isolation cannot
be achieved without some performance cost. Finally, OSes that favor portability
necessarily have higher level abstractions, as their abstractions must remain con-
stant as hardware evolves and thus, tend to be represented by high-level models for
system resources. This implies both a performance cost, due to mismatches between
the hardware and its higher-level abstraction, as well as a cost to security, since the
need to maintain abstractions indefinitely hampers improvements in security that
may result from improving abstractions to fix deficits or adapt to new hardware and
application demands. Exokernels, microkernels, and the monolithic architectures ex-
emplified by UNIX and its descendants tend to prioritize, respectively, performance,
isolation, and portability. We discuss these kernels next.
The Exokernel [3] architecture prioritize performance over all other factors.
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The interface exokernels provide is often non-portable and very closely matches the
hardware, which as argued by Clark et. al [4], enables the widest possible set of
application specific optimizations. All other design goals are sacrificed, with ease
of use, portability, and isolation sacrificed unless layered with a set of libraries that
define high-level abstractions, termed a “library OS,” that applications rely on. At
the limit, a library OS that prioritizes design goals other than performance will ulti-
mately recapitulate design choices and trade-offs made by other kernel architectures.
Microkernels [5], on the other hand, preference isolation as the over-riding
design principle. Liedtke explicitly argues that an abstraction should only be im-
plemented within the kernel (i.e., have direct access to hardware) if the desired
functionality cannot otherwise be achieved, leaving performance only as a secondary
consideration [6]. Microkernels offer relatively high-level abstractions that are built
as a set of userspace services that access hardware via interprocess communication
(IPC) with a small privileged kernel. The isolation and high-level abstractions may
hamper performance, but microkernels can be portable if the interface provided by
the user space services is preserved. Note that user space services are analogous to
library OSes, in that both are theoretically replaceable so long as portability is not
a concern.
Monolithic kernels, best exemplified by the descendants of UNIX, favor porta-
bility. POSIX [7], a standardization of a common set of OS abstractions and basic
utilities, specifies a set of abstractions supported by monolithic kernels that remain
largely unchanged for over 25 years. These abstractions, which are meant to support
a very broad set of hardware and application needs, tend to offer one-size-fits-all ab-
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stractions for hardware and applications. A cost of this portability is less flexibility
in meeting new application demands that were not considered when the abstractions
were standardized, as well as performance loss due to overhead from the OS abstrac-
tions that the applications must use. Monolithic kernels do make compromises to
mitigate performance costs. They limit isolation, which they may do without af-
fecting portability, which is a practice that leads to their name: almost the entirety
of the kernel runs within a single monolithic address-space at increased privilege.
Practical concerns do necessitate occasional violations of portability, such as near-
direct access to new hardware through an exokernel like interface (e.g., an interface
to an ASIC that accelerates machine learning calculations). These exceptions are
ad-hoc and do not always interact well with the other abstractions offered by the
OS
Each major OS architecture meets its design goals through a set of abstractions
that reflect and impose onto applications the priorities of the OS. Applications that
want to maximize performance may choose to run on an OS offering direct hardware
access (e.g., an exokernel), whereas applications with strong security requirements
might be best deployed on OS with stronger isolation (e.g., a microkernel).
New hardware and changing application requirements have given rise to ap-
plications with needs that cannot be met with any current OS architecture. Appli-
cations can subvert the restrictions of the OS while preserving compatibility, but
traditionally this may only be done if the OS itself is modified. Our own work in
developing new abstractions has suggested that the trade-off between constraints
is not inherent and can be avoided, not by choosing a single ideal abstraction, but
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instead by simultaneously exposing multiple abstractions for each available resource.
1.1 Thesis
Supporting novel hardware such as NVRAM and new abstractions like
fine-grained isolation while maintaining efficiency, usability, and security
goals, requires simultaneous access to both high-level OS abstractions and
compatible access to their low-level decompositions.
Next I will describe the terms in my thesis statement and discuss how they
affect OS design.
While there is no precise definition of low-level and high-level abstractions, for
the purpose of this dissertation we use low-level abstractions to refer to abstractions
that are more similar to the hardware than a higher level abstraction. We consider
direct hardware access as a low-level abstraction,and consider all high-level abstrac-
tions to be composed of one or more low-level abstractions. High-level abstractions
are built on top of one or more low-level abstractions and typically provide greater
ease of use, increased portability, or stronger isolation guarantees, but may sacrifice
performance. A decomposition of a higher-level abstraction is then the set of all
lower-level abstractions upon which the higher-level abstraction is built. Simulta-
neous access to both a high-level abstraction and its lower-level decomposition thus
implies that that a high-level abstraction may be exposed, but each of the lower-
level abstractions from which it is built should also be exposed and accessible to
applications.
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In the context of the architectures we discussed above, we then describe exoker-
nels as an OS with low-level abstractions and the monolithic kernels discussed above,
on the other extreme, as an OS with high-level abstractions. Neither OS consistently
exposes both high-level abstractions and their low-level decompositions. This im-
plies that exokernels may be arbitrarily adaptable, but at the cost of usability due
to significant implementation effort and loss of portability. Whereas the monolithic
kernels and their high-level abstractions give us portability, but at the cost of effi-
ciency that the end-to-end principle suggests is inherent with high-level abstractions.
An OS that exported both low and high-level abstractions accommodates a wider
set of applications, but care must be taken to do this safely.
The difficulty in exposing low and high-level abstractions simultaneously is one
of interference. With few exceptions, all abstractions have a set of invariants that
must be maintained for the abstraction to offer a useful contract with its callers. If
multiple high-level abstractions are built on top of the same low-level abstraction
(e.g., two separate file systems using the same block device) we need some mechanism
to prevent interference between different high-level abstractions. A traditional OS
achieves this by specifying how abstractions may be used a priori and requiring a
supervisory process (i.e., the kernel) to enforce usage. A priori specifications cannot
possibly meet the needs of all applications and must have embedded within them
their own design trade-offs.
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1.2 Contributions
As part of the work in evaluating the abstractions necessary to accommodate
new hardware and changing application demands, we developed two new abstrac-
tions, PTx (Chapter 3) and Light-Weight Contexts (Chapter 4. We also introduced
a new OS architecture, the null-Kernel (Chapter 5). Both PTx and Light-Weight
Contexts (lwCs) were designed and implemented on production operating systems
(FreeBSD and Linux respectively) and required access to traditional high-level OS
abstractions, as well as access to non-traditional low-level abstractions to meet their
performance goals. Building on our experiences in designing and implementing lwCs
and PTx, we propose the null-Kernel architecture, which is an architecture that en-
ables the simultaneous exposure of multiple abstractions for the same underlying
resources in a safe way. Under the null-Kernel, the development of new abstractions
such as lwCs and PTx would be accelerated, improving application performance and
security. The dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
We contextualize PTx and lwCs in relation to other work that provides similar
functionality. In addition to discussing the abstractions and capabilities of existing
systems, we note if and when related work relies on or provides different lower-
level OS abstractions than PTx and lwCs rely upon. We also discuss common
OS architectures and kernel extension mechanisms and discuss the problems these




We describe PTx, which uses a new form of non-volatile memory (NVRAM)
to efficiently persist in-core data structures to persistent media. We discuss the con-
sistency and performance challenges one faces when using NVRAM, and how PTx
solves these challenges. We evaluate PTx and show that it enables high performance
persistence of standard C++ data structures that exceed the performance of data
structures explicitly annotated for NVRAM. We also show that PTx can be used to
provide persistence to Redis [8], a popular key-value server, with comparable over-
head to custom solutions and minimal modification, or provide a compatible server
with superior performance within 430 lines of source code.
Chapter 4: Light-weight Contexts
We describe Light-weight contexts, which decouples memory isolation, exe-
cution state, and privilege separation from within a process. lwCs can be used to
provide snapshots, session isolation, reference monitoring, and protected compart-
ments within a process. We evaluate lwCs with a series of micro-benchmarks and
application scenarios and show that lwCs can provide enhanced security with low
overhead or improve performance with its snapshot facility.
Chapter 5: The null-Kernel
PTx and lwCs both showed that existing OS abstractions were insufficient
to deal with new hardware and increased security demands. We found that both
systems could be implemented by exposing and then making use of lower-level ab-
stractions, while portability concerns dictated that we preserve existing higher-level
abstractions. To generalize the constraints that we observed while building these
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systems, we developed the null-Kernel, a model for describing existing OS archi-
tectures and suggest new OS paradigms to support the simultaneous exposure of
low-level and high-level abstractions. We discuss how simultaneous exposure of ab-
stractions provides new opportunities for improving performance and security and
place PTx and lwCs in the null-Kernel context.
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work
We conclude by revisiting the contributions of this work. We discuss future
opportunities for improving PTx, both in terms of optimizations, as well as exten-
sions to functionality. We also discuss combining PTx and lwCs to create a form of
persistent lwC. Finally, we discuss the steps we have taken towards exposing lower-
level abstractions within FreeBSD to userspace and thus, bring FreeBSD closer in
line to a null-Kernel architecture.
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Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
In this chapter we discuss related work for persisting state to NVRAM, decou-
pling process primitives, such as isolation, and improving OS flexibility to hasten
the development of new abstractions for differing application requirements and new
hardware.
2.1 Abstractions for NVRAM
The price/performance characteristics of NVRAM make it an attractive new
point in the storage hierarchy. Currently available NVRAM can be operated in one
of two modes: memory and direct. In memory-mode, conventional DRAM is used
as a cache for data stored in NVRAM, affording several TB of main memory at
reasonable cost with performance close to DRAM for workloads with good locality.
In this mode, NVRAM is used for its byte addressability and low cost per byte; the
memory controller actively defeats persistence in this mode for security reasons, by
encrypting data and destroying the keys during a system restart.
In direct mode, NVRAM appears directly in the system’s physical address
space and can be accessed with conventional load and store operations, albeit at
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reduced performance compared to DRAM. Note that in this mode, once a NVRAM
page is mapped, loads and stores can be completed without OS intervention (i.e.,
without any abstraction overhead). Current commercially available NVRAM has
higher latency (3.7x slower) and lower bandwidth when the bus is saturated (1/3
and 1/6 of DRAM read and write bandwidth respectively) [9].
Operating systems expose direct-mode NVRAM in one of two configurations.
In the first configuration, the OS wraps NVRAM in a block device abstraction,
which is then accessed through a filesystem interface. Applications access the data
through the usual filesystem API, which has no bearing on the application other
than increased performance. In the second configuration, which PTx relies on, the
OS maps NVRAM directly into an application’s address space through the mmap
interface and applications modify persistent state through memory operations. This
latter form is a lower-level interface, which allows for higher performance.
Directly-mapped NVRAM by itself, however, does not provide immediate nor
atomic persistence. NVRAM accesses are subject to the same caching layers as
DRAM. Writes to mapped NVRAM are not automatically flushed to NVRAM and
thus, not persisted, until evicted from the CPU caches. A process may evict (and
thus persist) cache lines as needed, or applications may explicitly push writes to
NVRAM either via flush and fence instructions or via special instructions that by-
pass the cache. In either case, temporally proximate and spatially contiguous writes
are combined by the hardware and written to NVRAM with an effective block size
of 256 bytes. Regardless of the method chosen, persistence must be programmed
carefully to ensure that the persisted structure is in a consistent state, and thus
11
fault-tolerant, at all times, and that the NVRAM accesses are efficient. Failure to
do so can lead to very subtle, hard-to-detect and hard-to-recover-from bugs.
While an application can use the lower level direct-mapped NVRAM directly
to implement persistent data structures in principle, doing so is challenging both in
terms of performance and correctness. The application needs to carefully manage
data access locality and write amplification for performance, as well as use explicit
barriers and cache flush instructions carefully throughout. Failure to use these
instructions appropriately may result in inconsistent persistent states where the
program fails in specific states, which is very difficult to debug. Our work will offer
a higher-level abstraction that is different from the file system interface and reliant
on access to lower-level abstractions.
In the rest of this section, we describe prior work on using NVRAM, both as
a filesystem and for providing persistence. We also discuss existing solutions for
persistence, and compare them to PTx.
NVRAM file systems Several file systems take advantage of the performance
characteristics and byte addressability of NVRAM [10–12]. Just as file systems act
as a namespace to provide a handle to disk resources, an NVRAM file system can be
used to label NVRAM resources that can be mapped into the process address space.
The file system interface is a familiar one for programmers seeking persistence, but it
does impose overhead. At minimum, reading and writing to an NVRAM file require
system calls that copy data from NVRAM to and from DRAM.
Both NOVA-Fortis [10] and PMFS [11] allow applications to map the NVRAM
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data pages for a file directly into the application’s address space. This feature, which
the Linux EXT and XFS file systems also provide, is known as “direct-access,”
(DAX). DAX allows applications to modify file contents directly through CPU load
and store directions, and as such grant lower-level access to the hardware. NVRAM
file systems that do not support or are not DAX mapped support memory mapping
like traditional file systems: with a buffer cache. The OS pages data onto DRAM
from NVRAM on demand and writes all modified DRAM pages to NVRAM either
opportunistically or when msync is called. Implementing persistent data structures
through file system mappings shares the challenges described above. PTx, which
offers an alternate high-level abstraction, relies on DAX mappings to read and write
to NVRAM internally but does not expose the mappings directly to applications.
NVRAM aware data structures Many prior systems have provided persistence
using bespoke NVRAM aware data structures [13], such as customized b+-trees [14,
15], radix trees [16], key value stores [17, 18], hash tables [19, 20], and write-ahead
logging [21, 22]. PTx instead enables efficient persistence for legacy data structure
implementations without annotation or modification to the data structure source
code.
Transactional Memory and Semantics Transactional memory was introduced
as a method of concurrency control. In this context, serializability and isolation
between threads are key requirements, while durability is irrelevant because trans-
actions are performed on volatile DRAM. Similarly, transactions for concurrency
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control tend to be short to enable fine-grained concurrency (e.g., add an item to a
data structure).
More recently, transactional memory has been used as an abstraction for
atomic updates to persistent memory, such as NVRAM. Here, atomicity with re-
spect to failures is the key property: updates to persistent state must be applied in
their entirely or not at all. Isolation between threads for concurrency control may
or may not be provided. In this context, transactions tend to be larger as they
may include updates to multiple data structures that must be applied atomically to
maintain invariants application-wide, not just within a single data structure
Many persistent memory systems use a transaction abstraction [23–30] or
an atomic keyword [31] to delineate state changes that must be persisted atomi-
cally. Some of these systems operate much like transactional memory systems for
concurrency control, and provide concurrent consistency [23, 25, 27], whereas oth-
ers [26,28,31], like PTx, expect applications to use external concurrency primitives
for thread isolation within a process.
Transactional memory systems implement crash atomicity using logging. Sys-
tems that use undo logging [25–27] copy to-be-modified state to persistent memory
before allowing modifications to occur. Applications then make modifications in
place (i.e., directly in NVRAM) within a transaction. The undo log is only used to
recover from a fault. Other systems use redo logging [31] and write updates to a
redo log, to be applied to the main persistent store upon commit. Within a trans-
action, reads are redirected so that they read the proper values from the redo log.
Pronto [32] wraps operations on data structures and asynchronously logs operations
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and their arguments that may be replayed against the data structure API in the
event of a failure.
Intel’s persistent memory toolkit (PMDK) [26] provides a transactional inter-
face that uses a combination of undo and redo logs to provide atomicity. Like PTx,
PMDK does not provide isolation between threads, but unlike PTx, PMDK writes
directly to NVRAM and requires programmer annotations to indicate the write set.
DudeTM [23] attempts to limit both the overhead caused by modifying NVRAM
within a transaction, as well as the overhead incurred from the redo log indirection.
Towards this end, DudeTM performs modifications on shadow DRAM pages and
writes a redo log in volatile memory. As part of commit, the volatile redo log is
flushed to NVRAM and subsequently, the persistent redo log is applied to the persis-
tent data. PTx also makes all modifications to volatile shadow pages, but does not
maintain an explicit redo or undo log. Instead, the PTx log structure enables writ-
ing a comparatively succinct undo log as a set of updates to the mapping between
DRAM and NVRAM addresses.
Ni et al. [28] propose a design that also eliminates explicit undo logs, by atom-
ically updating mapping information upon commit, but their approach relies on
hardware modifications. Hu et al. [33] also use a log structure for data in NVRAM.
New allocations are appended to the log and reads and writes are intercepted and
redirected so that they act directly on the log. PTx does not require interception
of reads and writes, and PTx’s log does not require periodic cleaning due to frag-
mentation. Correia et al. [34] present a persistent transactional memory system
based on universal constructions. Their work eliminates blocking transactions, but
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either requires code annotation or flushing all the memory where the data structure
resides upon commit. This over-approximation of the write set is prohibitive for
transactions over large data structures.
2.2 Decoupling Process Abstractions
Privacy-compromising exploits, such as Heartbleed [35], suggest that existing
isolation abstractions, such as processes, either do not meet current isolation require-
ments, or do not meet them with sufficient expressiveness of performance. lwCs take
the process abstraction, and decouples the isolation, scheduling, and privilege prop-
erties traditionally provided by a process and uses them to offer new abstractions
that provides for strong, finer-grained isolation with minimal performance overhead,
as well as snapshots and reference monitoring. Other systems also revisit lower-level
aspects of the process abstraction and put them to new use, which we discuss now.
Wedge [36] provides privilege separation and isolation among sthreads, which
are a new unit of encapsulation for an application. The program is split up into a
series of sthreads, which by default share little to no state, and regions of computa-
tion gated by callgates. Each callgate is associated with an sthread, and whenever
another sthread attempts to invoke a callgate (i.e., enter a protected region of com-
putation), the caller thread is blocked and the sthread associated with the callgate
is scheduled to execute the gated code, potentially while accessing protected state,
and return a value back to the calling thread. Unlike lwCs, scheduling and isolation
are still coupled in Wedge, but sthreads are a finer unit of isolation than a process
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and have a similar goal of protecting sensitive parts of a program’s execution. lwCs
are orthogonal to threads and therefore avoid the cost of scheduling when switching
contexts. Moreover, lwCs can snapshot and resume an execution in any state, while
a sthread can only revert to its initial state. Wedge provides a software analysis tool
that helps refactor existing applications into multiple isolated compartments. lwCs
could benefit from a such a tool as well.
Shreds [37] builds on architectural support for memory domains in ARM
CPUs, a compiler toolchain, and kernel support to provide isolated compartments of
code and data within a process. Like lwCs, shreds provide isolated contexts within
a process. lwCs, however, are fully independent of threads, require no compiler sup-
port, and rely on page-based hardware protection only. lwCs also provide protection
rings and snapshots, which shreds do not.
In SpaceJMP [38], address spaces are first-class objects separate from pro-
cesses, which demonstrates broader utility for lower-level address space abstractions
that are decoupled from the process. While both systems can switch address spaces
within a process, SpaceJMP and lwCs provide different abstractions, capabilities,
and are motivated by entirely different applications. SpaceJMP supports applica-
tions that wish to use memory larger than the available virtual address bits allow,
wish to maintain pointer-based data structures beyond process lifetime, and share
large memory objects among processes. A SpaceJMP context switch is not associ-
ated with a mandatory control transfer and, therefore, SpaceJMP does not support
applications that require isolation or privilege separation within a process. lwCs, on
the other hand, provide in-process isolated contexts, privilege separation, and snap-
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shots. It should be noted, however, that the SpaceJMP address space abstraction
is a low-level abstraction that is similar to the address space abstraction proposed
in Section 5.5 for supporting new isolation abstractions in the null-Kernel, and in
concert with other abstractions for managing control flow, could be used to provide
isolation.
In Trellis [39], code annotations, a compiler, run time, and OS kernel module
provide privilege separation within an application. The kernel and runtime ensure
that functions can be called and data accessed only by code with the same or
higher privilege level. lwCs provide privilege separation without language/compiler
support, and can switch domains at lower cost. Moreover, lwCs additionally support
snapshots.
Switching among lwCs is similar to migrating threads in Mach [40], where
they were implemented to optimize local RPCs. Migration of threads across address
spaces is also an element of the model described by Lindström et al. [41] and the
COMPOSITE OS [42]. In single address space operating systems (SASOS) like
Opal [43] and Mungi [44], all processes as well as persistent storage share a single
large (64-bit) address space. Unlike lwCs, these systems do not provide privilege
separation, isolation, or snapshots within a process.
Mondrian Memory Protection (MMP) [45] and Mondrix [46] use hardware ex-
tensions to provide protection at fine granularity within processes. The CHERI [47,
48] architecture, compiler, and operating system provides hybrid hardware-software
object capabilities for fine-grained compartmentalization within a process. lwCs
provide in-process isolation at page granularity without specialized hardware or
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language support.
Resource containers [49] separate the unit of resource accounting from a pro-
cess and account for all resources associated with an application activity, even if
the activity requires processing in multiple processes and the kernel. Resource con-
tainers decompose task accounting from processes. lwCs are orthogonal to resource
containers and as such, do not make use of accounting decomposition.
The Corey [50] OS provides fine-grained control over the sharing of memory
regions and kernel resources among CPU cores to minimize contention. These lower-
level abstractions are orthogonal to the capabilities of in-process isolation, privilege
separation, and snapshots provided by lwCs.
Light-weight isolation, privilege separation, and snapshots can be provided also
within a programming language. Functional languages like Scheme and ML provide
closures through the primitive call/cc, which can be used to record a program state
and revert to it later, and to implement co-routines. Typed object-oriented lan-
guages like C++ and Java provide static isolation and privilege separation through
private and protected class fields but do not isolate objects of the same class from
each other. Dynamic language-based protection, often implemented as object ca-
pabilities [51–53], provides fine-grained isolation and privilege separation but has
considerable runtime overhead. lwCs instead provide in-process isolation, privilege
separation, and snapshots at the OS level, independent of a programming language.
In low-level languages like C, isolation and privilege separation can be attained
using binary rewriting and compiler-inserted checks as in CFI [54], CPI [55] and
secure compilation [56]. All these techniques rely on dynamic checks that have
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runtime overhead. Techniques such as CPI and secure compilation rely on OS
support for the isolation of a reference monitor, which lwCs can provide at low cost.
ERIM [57] uses binary inspection in concert with Intel’s memory protection keys to
provide memory isolation between contexts with minimal overhead. While ERIM
provides similar virtual memory isolation, it does not provide isolation for file tables
or privilege.
Software fault isolation (SFI) [58] and NaCl [59] rely on static checking and
instrumentation of binaries to isolate memory within applications running on un-
modified operating systems. SFI and NaCl do not selectively protect system calls
and file descriptors. lwCs instead allow fine-grained control over memory, file de-
scriptors and other process credentials, and provide snapshots as part of an OS
abstraction.
Process checkpoint facilities create a linearized snapshot of a process’s state [60–
63]. The snapshot can be stored persistently and subsequently used to reconstitute
the process and resume its execution on the same or a different machine. Checkpoint
facilities are used for fault-tolerance and load balancing. lwCs instead provide very
fast in-memory snapshots of a process’s state.
The Determinator OS [64] relies on a private workspace model for concurrency
control, which enables deterministic execution on multi-core platforms. To support
the model, Determinator provides spaces, in which programs mutate private copies
of shared objects. Like lwCs, spaces provide isolated address spaces. Unlike a lwC,
however, a space is tied to one thread, does not have access to I/O or shared memory,
and can interact only with its parent and only in limited ways.
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Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [65] provide ISA support to isolate
code and data in enclaves within a process. By mapping contexts to enclaves, SGX
could be used to harden lwCs against a stronger threat model (untrusted OS) and
to provide hardware attestation of contexts. However, enclaves have no access to
OS services, so some lwC applications would need considerable re-architecting to
run on SGX.
NOVA [66] provides protection domains (separate address spaces) and execu-
tion contexts (an abstraction similar to threads) in a micro hypervisor. NOVA’s goal
is to isolate VMMs and VMs from the core hypervisor, which is different from lwC’s
goal of providing isolation, privilege separation, and snapshots within processes.
Dune [67] provides a kernel module and API that export the Intel VT-x archi-
tectural virtualization support safely to Linux processes. This is akin to a form of
layer bypassing supported by null-Kernel that allows low-level access to hardware,
but this access is virtualized. The low-level interface granted is not a decomposition
of abstractions used by higher-level abstractions, but is instead disjoint from the
higher-level abstractions. Consequently, while privilege separation, reference moni-
tors, and isolated compartments can be implemented within a process using Dune,
these abstractions cannot be seamlessly integrated with the kernel’s existing abstrac-
tions. lwCs, by contrast, instead provide a unified abstraction and API for these
capabilities, and their implementation does not rely on virtualization hardware, the
use of which could interfere with execution on a virtualized platform.
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2.3 Improving OS Flexibility
VINO [68] and SPIN [69] offer mechanisms to safely extend monolithic ker-
nels. Both systems require extensions to be written against a restricted, internal
interface that maintains kernel invariants. These systems can be thought of as a
limited instantiation of the hybrid system presented earlier, but access to the inter-
nal interface cannot be shared in a structured manner. This limits how extensions
(AMs) relate:for instance, layer bypassing is not possible in either.
Microkernels [6] seL4 [70] and Barrelfish [71] export kernel objects to user
space as capabilities. Capability types exported by the system are static. As a
result, layer bypassing via delegated capabilities is not supported.
Exokernels [3] provide a minimal, non-portable hardware-like interface. Ex-
okernel abstractions allow for the allocation and revocation of hardware resources
in a manner similar to capability allocation, but unlike capabilities, these resources
cannot be shared or reduced except by proxying through the resource owner.
EROS [72], derived from KeyKOS [73], is a stateless kernel that maps hard-
ware into a set of capabilities. Applications use the operations permitted by these
capabilities to construct higher level abstractions. EROS is equivalent to a specific
instantiation of the null-Kernel that only exports a low level AM. HiStar [74] also
exposes a limited set of kernel objects to user space, limiting access to those objects
by tracking information flow.
The Cal timesharing system [75], Cambridge CAP computer [76] and Fluke [77]
all allow an interface’s operations to be implemented and over-ridden in a nested
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manner that is similar to subclasses. This layering is constrained by capabilities.
Unlike the null-Kernel, the interface for these interfaces is fixed.
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Chapter 3: PTx
In this chapter we discuss PTx, a new abstraction for efficiently persisting in-
core data structures to a new form of byte addressable and persistent non-volatile
RAM (NVRAM).
3.1 Introduction
Non-volatile RAM (NVRAM) is a newly available memory technology that
may have profound impact on both system hardware and software structure. The
reason for this impending shift is that NVRAM has a cost/byte and speed between
DRAM and Flash memory, is byte-addressable via unprivileged CPU instructions,
and persistent. Thus NVRAM promises to combine the best features of DRAM
(directly addresseable/memory mapped, performance) with those of disk/solid state
memory (persistence, relatively low cost per byte).
We focus on the potential for NVRAM to enable persistent data structures.
For example, an in-memory database could persist on NVRAM, obviating the need
to save modified data on an external storage device for persistence. As a result,
NVRAM has the potential to significantly reduce the cost of persisting state, en-
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abling higher performance for a given granularity of transactions, or enabling more
fine-grained transactions at a given level of performance.
There are two primary challenges when using NVRAM for persisting process
state. First, performance: when saturated, NVRAM writes are ∼6x slower than
DRAM writes [9], which generally precludes using NVRAM as a direct replacement
for DRAM. Instead, NVRAM is used as a backing store for DRAM and writes to
NVRAM must be minimized for efficiency. Minimizing extraneous NVRAM writes
is simple for some specific data structures, such as an append-only log. In general,
however, it requires appropriate techniques for determining which parts of a process’s
state need to be persisted and which parts of that state were modified as part of
a transaction. Performance also requires a design that minimizes NVRAM write
amplification, i.e., modified data should have to be written only once per commit in
the common case.
The second challenge is consistency: Processes may crash at any point in
their execution, and even if all memory writes are saved, the restored state may
not be consistent if the failure occurs when invariants on the application’s state
don’t hold. For instance, an application-level transaction may involve modifications
to multiple data structures that need to be performed atomically. Restored state
must satisfy not only the individual data structures’ invariants, but also invariants
across the application state. Moreover, without additional information about the
failed operation, it may be impossible to return to a consistent state without loss of
information.
We introduce PTx, a userspace persistence library specialized for the perfor-
25
mance and atomicity needs to persist data structures to NVRAM. PTx enables
programs to achieve failure atomicity for arbitrary code sequences simply by brack-
eting them with primitives to begin and end a transaction. No further annotation is
required on code executing inside a transaction; in particular, existing unmodified
data structure libraries can be invoked as part of a transaction, thus transparently
persisting these data structures. While executing inside a transaction, the program
can access data at DRAM speed. When ending the transactions, PTx persists the
transaction atomically while minimizing the number of NVRAM writes required.
As discussed in Section 2.1, state-of-the-art, high-performance persistent data
structures require manual annotation of individual memory writes, so that these
changes can be written to persistent storage efficiently. We introduce several high
performance automatic change trackers, which relieve the programmer from having
to annotate source code to track changes. PTx trackers are akin to existing compiler-
based mechanisms, such as those developed for Software Transactional Memory [78,
79], but provide much higher performance.
Because data accesses within a PTx transaction proceed at DRAM speed,
existing data structures not designed for the reduced access speed of NVRAM
may be used without penalty and subsequently persisted efficiently. Finally, PTx
persists data in NVRAM using a data structure that supports non-destructive
writes, avoiding unnecessary and costly NVRAM writes and the need for log clean-
ing/compaction. The combination of automatic, language independent write-set
tracking, DRAM-speed data access within a transaction, and low NVRAM write
amplification enables PTx to efficiently persist existing data structure implementa-
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tions, without modifying their source code and even when transactions are large.
We experiment with persisting the standard C++ STL data structures [80].
With PTx automatic tracking, these structures can be made transparently persis-
tent, and perform close to their native DRAM speeds. This allows PTx to match or
exceed the query throughput of custom, hand optimized systems, such as LMDB,
Redis, pmem-Redis, and previously developed NVRAM data structures, all of which
require manual annotations to track changes.
This chapter is organized as follows: we provide a technical background on
NVRAM and discuss related work in Section 2.1. The design of PTx, including
its persistent data structures and algorithms is presented in Section 3.2. We dis-
cuss implementation specifics in Section 3.3. Section 3.3 contains a comprehensive




PTx aims to enable persistent in-core data structures for existing systems and
applications, without requiring extensive changes to code. An application should be
able to link to the PTx library, map persistent memory objects into the application’s
address space using PTx’s API, use the PTx memory allocator to allocate addi-
tional persistent memory dynamically. The programmer should be able to bracket
sequences of operations on state that should be persisted atomically with transac-
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tion start and commit primitives as required. Any existing persistence mechanism
within the application can be disabled. (Such a mechanism typically serializes and
explicitly writes its persistent state to an external storage device, or invokes sync
operations on memory-mapped files at appropriate points in its execution.) Due
to the greater efficiency afforded by PTx and NVRAM, the application can benefit
from increased performance, or persist its state more frequently. To realize this
vision, PTx has the following design constraints:
DRAM-speed data access: Existing data structure implementations designed
for DRAM may perform poorly on NVRAM. For instance, fine-grained writes get
amplified to 256-byte block writes. Therefore, accesses within a transaction should
be performed on DRAM.
Automatic write set tracking: Since existing data structure implementations
don’t explicitly state their write sets, we need to rely on automatic techniques
to determine them. These techniques must reliably capture all modified state for
correctness, without significantly over-approximating the write set.
Low write amplification: Applications are typically interested in persisting states
that correspond to completed application-level transactions, not mutations of indi-
vidual data structures. Therefore, transactional updates to persistent state are
typically larger than memory transactions used for concurrency control. Efficiently
supporting such transactions requires low amplification of NVRAM writes, i.e., mod-
ified data should be written only once per commit and at the 256 byte granularity
of NVRAM.
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3.2.2 PTx colors and operations
PTx supports multiple memory pools called colors. Each color is backed by
an NVRAM file with separate access permissions. An application can map multiple
colors for which it holds permissions into its address space. Each color has a separate
dynamic memory allocator. PTx transactions operate on a single color, allowing
applications to persist data of any one color atomically. Applications may also
allocate memory in different colors and transact on them separately.
The PTx library exports four operations that each operate on a color c:
ptx malloc (c) allocates persistent memory associated with a particular color. ptx begin
(c) starts a transaction on a color, ptx commit (c) commits a transaction, and
ptx restore (c) rolls back the color to the last committed state. Note that ptx restore
(c) can be used at the start of a program execution to reinstate the last committed
state of a color, or during execution to abort an uncommitted transaction on a color.
We call the data of a given color persisted via a commit a snapshot. Later instanti-
ations of the application or other applications may restore the latest snapshot of a
given color into their address space by calling ptx restore().
At runtime, PTx stores persistent data in main memory, which the application
may read or write at DRAM speed. The “write set” represents the set of locations
within a color that were modified within a transaction. PTx uses “trackers” to
determine the write set, as described in Section 3.2.6. When the application invokes
ptx commit(), the write set is written to NVRAM atomically.
At any time, the application, a later instantiation of the same application, or
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a different application with appropriate permissions may restore the last committed
state of a memory pool into its address space using ptx restore (c).
3.2.3 PTx Semantics
PTx transactions are committed atomically with respect to failures of appli-
cations and systems. From an application’s perspective, a persistent memory pool
(“color”) is either updated entirely or not at all as part of a commit. Critically, this
implies that as long as a memory pool’s invariants hold at the time of a commit call,
those invariants will hold after a system fault/recovery. An application may per-
sist multiple data structures by allocating them using the same color, and different
processes may simultaneously map the same color into their address spaces.1
PTx provides atomicity, durability, and consistency/isolation between pro-
cesses (but not threads). The semantics provided by PTx are similar to ACID
transactions at the level of processes. However, PTx transactions do not provide
concurrency control among different threads of a process. Such synchronization
normally occurs at a different granularity as PTx transactions and doesn’t require
atomic persistence. To synchronize among threads of the same process, an appli-
cation must use a separate mechanism, such as locks or conventional transactional
memory.




Next we describe the storage components of PTx’s design, namely the data
layer, the log, and the map.
PTx data layer: The data layer stores persistent data and associated metadata in
NVRAM. It must do so efficiently and maintain the ability to recover in the event
of system failures. Towards this end, the store performs non-destructive data writes
and minimizes write-amplification by allowing modified data to be written only once
per transaction.
The data layer is organized as an array of fixed sized blocksets in NVRAM.
Each blockset contains space for 41 data blocks of 256 bytes each, plus an additional
256 bytes for metadata. During a commit, PTx writes modified data into available
data blocks in the data layer. The unit of allocation is a data block, although PTx
seeks to allocate entire blocksets when possible. Note that the blocks of a data
structure are typically stored non-contiguously in the data layer. Because NVRAM
can sustain random block accesses with little or no performance degradation, there
is no need for cleaning or compaction, which would create overhead and increase
write amplification.
PTx log: A small, persistent circular log is used to support atomic transactions
whose write set does not fit into a single blockset. The log holds metadata about
a transaction during a commit; specifically, the transaction’s sequence number, and
the set of data blocks written as part of the transaction, followed by a hash. In case
of a system failure before the hash is written, the information in the undo log is
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used to free uncommitted data blocks in the data layer and add them to the free
list.
PTx map: The map associates virtual addresses of data blocks in an application’s
address space with addresses in the data layer, where the last committed state of the
block is stored. In the NVRAM, the map is distributed over the metadata blocks
of the data layer. During execution, a copy of the map, organized as a range tree
for efficiency, resides in main memory for efficiency. During a system restart, the
in-memory range tree is reconstituted from metadata in the data layer.
PTx free list: The free list is an in-memory data structure that indicates which
blocks in the data layer are free. Like the in-memory map, it is reconstituted during
a system (re-)start from the data layer metadata.
3.2.5 PTx primitives
Function Description
BlockLocation ←getFreeBlock() returns free BlockLocation
⊥ ←freeBlock(BlockLocation) sets BlockLocation to be empty
⊥ ←copyToBlock(VAddr, BlockLocation) copies Data from VAddr into BlockLocation
⊥ ←copyToVAddr(BlockLocation, VAddr) copies Data from BlockLocation into VAddr
⊥ Object.persist() Flushes calling object to NVRAM
Table 3.1: Auxillary functions used in PTx
Next, we describe the PTx primitives. Basic data types and global structures
are defined in Algorithm 1, auxiliary functions are defined in Table 3.1. Here, we
assume that a write of an individual data block to the NVRAM (Object.persist()
in Table 3.1) is atomic with respect to system failures. We discuss in Section 3.2.7
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Algorithm 1 PTx Basic Data Types and Global Structures
1: type BlockSet
2: Header = {seqNum, VAddr[41]} . Seq. #, 41 VAddrs
3: BlockData = Data[41] . 41 Data items
4:
5: type BlockLocation
6: blockID . ID of BlockSet in NVRAM
7: blockIndex . index within BlockSet
8:
9: type UndoLogEntry
10: Locations = ¡BlockLocation¿ . sequence of BlockLocations
11: SequenceNum . sequence number of commit
12: Hash . Hash of commit
13:
14: type CommitEntry
15: VAddr . Virtual Address




20: BlockStore . Sequence of BlockSets; stored in NVRAM
21: UndoLog . Seq. of UndoLogEntry(ies); stored in NVRAM
22:
23: WriteSet . Seq. of CommitEntries; generated by App./tracker
24: InMemoryMap . DRAM map of VAddr → BlockLocation
25: SeqNum . In-memory copy of last Sequence Number
how to generalize the design in case the NVRAM controller does not provide this
guarantee.
ptx commit: The commit operation atomically persists the write set of the current
transaction on a given color. The pseudocode for commit is shown in Algorithm 2.
(i) The transaction’s write set is determined using one of the methods described in
Section 3.2.6 and passed as an argument to commit.
(ii) We write all data in the transaction’s write set into currently unused blocks in
the data layer, relying on the free list to identify such blocks. To ensure Invariant
1 (see below), we choose blocks such that the current and any previous version of
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Algorithm 2 PTx commit Schematic
1: function writeData(WriteSet C)
2: bMap ←{} . temp. map from BlockLocation → VAddr
3: u ←UndoLogEntry.new . new empty UndoLog entry
4: UndoLog u . Append to undoLog











16: u.persist . flush the undoLog entry to NVRAM
17: function updateMap(bMap)
18: U ←UndoLog.last
19: U.Locationu . for BlockLocation in the last undoLog
20: b ←BlockStore[u.blockID]











Algorithm 3 PTx restore Schematic
1: function verifyUndoLog
2: u ←UndoLog.last












15: UndoLog.discardLast . remove last entry from UndoLog
16: function restoreDRAM
17: for b ∈seq BlockStore
18: . traverse by BlockSet sequence numbers, highest first
19: b.Header.VAddrvaddr
20: . iterate over virtual addresses in header
21: continue if vaddr = ⊥
22: continue if InMemoryMap[vaddr] . already restored
23: copyToVAddr(vaddr, b.BlockData[vaddr.index])
24: . vaddr.index is index of vaddr in Header.VAddr
25: InMemoryMap[vaddr] ←{b.index, vaddr.index}
26: . b.index is index of block b in BlockStore
27: function Restore
28: if ¬ verifyUndoLog
29: UndoLog.discardLast
30: elsif ¬ verifyLastSync
31: rollBack
32:
33: SeqNum ←UndoLog.last ? UndoLog.last.SequenceNum : 0
34: restoreDRAM
the same memory location don’t end up in the same blockset. Whenever possible,
we use as few data layer blocksets with as many free blocks as possible to reduce
overhead and write amplification. At this point, the write set is in NVRAM but
the associated blocks are considered unused and their content ignored in case of a
failure.
35
(iii) We append to the undo log the transaction’s sequence number, followed by the
list of data layer blocks that were written in step (ii).
(iv) We rewrite the headers of blocksets that contain newly written data blocks. The
header of each blockset is modified in three ways. First, the sequence number is set
to the current transaction’s. Second, we inspect all previously allocated blocks in
the set to see if they have been superseded by a committed transaction, as indicated
by the in-memory map, and then we set the address fields of all obsolete blocks to
⊥. This ensures that the most recently committed value of a data block resides
in a blockset with a higher sequence number than any previous version of that
block. Third, the address fields of newly written blocks are changed from ⊥ to their
virtual offset, thereby allocating the blocks and associating them with an offset in
the application’s address space. At this point, the write set of the uncommitted
transaction is allocated in the data layer. This is safe, because the undo log has
the information required to deallocate the blocks in case of a failure before the
transaction commits.
(v) We append a hash of all information related to the transaction to the undo log
and flush the log entry to NVRAM. At this point, the transaction is committed.
(vi) We update the in-memory map and free list with the newly allocated blocks
and their mappings.
The implementation of commit maintains
Invariant 1: When traversing blocksets in the data store in decreasing order of
sequence numbers, the first occurrences of a block’s virtual address represents the
most recent version of the block (if it was ever written).
36
System shutdown: During an orderly system shutdown, PTx writes the in-
memory map and free list to NVRAM, followed by the latest transaction sequence
number and hash.
ptx restore: The restore operation executes upon every system restart. The
pseudocode for restore is shown in Algorithm 3.
(i) We check if the restart follows an orderly system shutdown, indicated by the
presence of complete, consistent copies of the map and free list in NVRAM. If so,
it loads the map and free list into main memory and skips the remaining steps.
(ii) We find the end of the undo log by searching for the entry with the highest
sequence number. Due to the presence of hashes, we can reliably find sequence
numbers even though the entries in the undo log have variable length.
(iii) If the last transaction recorded in the log has committed, as indicated by a valid
hash at the end of the record, we skip to step (v).
(iv) To roll back an uncommitted transaction, restore iterates over the list of block
ids in the undo log, finds the associated data layer blocksets, and sets the address
fields of blocks written by the uncommitted transaction to ⊥.
(v) We reconstitute the in-memory map and free list by traversing the data layer
blocksets in order of decreasing sequence number. We know that the block with
a given address first encountered during this traversal is the last committed block
(see Invariant 1); we add it to the map and mark it as allocated in the free list.
If we encounter blocks with the same address again during the traversal, we set its
address field in the blockset header to ⊥ and mark it as free in the free list.
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There is also an API version of restore that can be invoked by applications
to map the persistent memory pool of a given color into an application’s address
space.
Write amplification PTx’s data structures and commit are optimized the reduce
write amplification. During a commit, each modified block is written only once to
NVRAM, which is optimal since a block is the smallest writable unit. However, the
metadata in the data layer as well as the undo log add extra writes that we must
consider.
The data layer stores one metadata block for each blockset of 41 data blocks;
the block must be written (eventually) whenever one or more data blocks in the set
are newly allocated or superseded by a transaction. The undo log requires a sequence
number, a hash, and a 9-byte record for each blockset written (30bit blockset id;
41bit block bitmap).
Depending on the average number of blocks per blockset written by a transac-
tion, the amplification can range from 5.2% (41 blocks per set in a large transaction
of 1MB) to 313% in the worst case (a tiny one-block transaction). This shows that
allocating as few blocksets as possible is important. Since PTx is optimized for
medium- to large transactions, the main requirement for low write amplification is
that we update as few blocksets as possible with a high average number of blocks
written. PTx achieves an average write amplification of 8.4% in our experiments
(see Section 3.3.6).
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3.2.6 Tracking Write Sets
Next, we briefly review approaches to tracking the write set within a trans-
action. The write set must be complete for correctness and should not vastly over-
approximate the true write set for performance. Approaches broadly fall into three
categories:
Source code annotation Data structure source code can be annotated to keep
track of modifications. While conceptually simple, the application programmer has
to be diligent to mark all possible updates to the data structure, without errors,
and ideally, not overestimate the write set.
Compiler/Runtime tracking With appropriate runtime/compiler support, the
write set can be automatically generated without programmer input. In our eval-
uation, we use compiler annotations for Software Transactional Memory (STM) in
gcc [81] to automatically trap and record writes within a colored region.
Hardware-assisted tracking MMU-hardware provides page write protections
and dirty bits, and either can be used to track writes to a colored region. Operating
systems offer APIs to use both methods: write-protect a region and receive notifi-
cation about the first write to a page; or, reset the dirty bits in a region and inspect
the bits as part of the commit2. In our implementation, we use trackers based on
page faults and on dirty bits.
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Figure 3.1: Overview of PTx: Applications allocate persistent data structures using
“colored” parts of the heap. PTx tracks changes to the colored regions, and atomically
updates persistent copies in NVRAM upon commit. Details of the NVRAM structure and
atomic update are described in the text.
Diffing Because NVRAM writes are slower than NVRAM and DRAM reads, it
can make sense to compare the content of a page to be committed with its last
committed state in order to narrow down the write set and minimize NVRAM
writes. In our evaluation, we use this approach in combination with page-based
modification tracking to narrow down which 256-byte blocks within a page were
modified. We have found that this optimization often reduces the number of blocks
that need to be written by up to 60%.
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3.2.7 Non-atomic NVRAM block writes
Our design and prototype assume that writes of individual NVRAM blocks
are atomic with respect to failures. Existing software, including Intel’s PMDK
SDK [26], appears to rely on this assumption. However, we were unable to find any
direct confirmation of this guarantee in Intel’s documentation of Optane NVRAM
memory. In case that Optane, or any future NVRAM product, does not provide
atomic block writes, the PTx design can be extended as follows: in the absence
of atomic block writes, we have to avoid destructive writes of blockset headers,
because a failed write could leave a header in an arbitrary state. Instead, the
blockset headers can be placed into a separate circular log, where each block has an
additional blockset id and a hash value to be able to verify its integrity. Updated
headers are appended to the end of the log. After a restart, the most recent version
of a blockset’s header can be found by traversing the log in order of decreasing
sequence numbers.
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3.3 Evaluation of PTx
PTx is implemented as a userspace library and includes the components de-
scribed in Section 3.2. PTx is written in C++ (with a C compatibility layer) and
relies on the NVRAM support provided by the Linux 5.3 kernel. The core of the
library itself is comprised of 8629 source lines of code, with an additional 7504 source
lines of code for workload generation and testing. The malloc-like allocator provided
by PTx is a modified form of Doug Lea’s malloc [82] and is not counted in the line
count above.
The mechanism provided by the Linux 5.3 kernel to directly map NVRAM
pages into the address space is to by configuring NVRAM as a block device, format-
ting it with ext3 or XFS, and mounting it with “direct-access” enabled. We chose
XFS as our file system because it performed better under preliminary evaluation.
PTx used it to directly mapped NVRAM into our process’s address space.
In Intel Optane NVRAM hardware, writes smaller than 256 bytes are ampli-
fied to 256 bytes, and there is no performance advantage to more granular writes.
Consequently, PTx is designed to operate largely in terms of 256 byte increments, as
we have described in the previous section. PTx uses non-temporal stores, which by-
pass the write-back cache,to write blocks into NVRAM in 256 byte increments with
an AVX instruction (VMOVNTDQ), which bypasses the cache and does not need
an additional flush operation (writes to NVRAM are not persistent until evicted
from the cache, either implicitly or via a flush call. Non-temporal stores make the
flush unnecessary). Since PTx rarely reads from NVRAM (except during restore
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and, for some trackers, commit), using non-temporal stores reduces cache pollution.
3.3.1 Experimental setup
We evaluate PTx by measuring the cost of persisting different in-memory data
structures, including b-trees, red-black trees, and hash tables. The data structures
we use are either the standard C++ library constructs, or the NVRAM specific struc-
tures developed for PMDK. (We use the latter for comparing directly with PMDK,
as PMDK requires these bespoke implementations.) Along with microbenchmarks
over these data structures, we compare PTx persistence against Lightning Memory-
Mapped Database (LMDB) [83], which is a database designed for high performance
and persistence, to Redis [8], a high performance key-value store, and to Pmem-
Redis [84], a custom port of Redis for use with NVRAM.
Our evaluation server has two 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon Platinum 8260 24 core
CPUs, 384 gigabytes of RAM, and 3 terabytes of NVRAM. We mounted a 1.5 TB
NVRAM backed XFS file system in “direct access” mode, which disabled the page
cache and allows NVRAM to be directly mapped into a process address space via
the mmap call. All of the memory used (NVRAM and DRAM) was local to one CPU,
to which we bound all process execution and memory allocation.
There are two critical aspects to the performance of any persistence scheme:
the overhead of write set tracking, and the efficiency of the writeback to persistent
storage. For tracking, PMDK requires manual annotation of source code, whereas
PTx provides automated trackers. In our comparison, we evaluated the four PTx
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automatic trackers described in Section 3.2.6, and also a manual tracker for PTx.
(While not a generic persistence platform, LMDB manually tracks changes for the
dictionary data structure it implements).
PTx, PMDK, LMDB all implement their own writeback mechanism, and all
provide data structure consistency and persistence. We evaluate all three, and in
addition, as a reference, we also compare against a directly mapped NVRAM region.
The latter provides persistence but does not provide atomicity or consistency by
itself.
When using PTx with the PMDK data structures, we replace the PMDK
writeback mechanism with PTx’s when the driver application invokes commit. The
PMDK data structure implementations explicitly state the write set, since that
is required by PMDK, but PTx’s automated trackers are not provided with this
information.
Experiment Design In each experiment, we populate the data structures with
1,000,000 integer keys and 2500 byte values. Insertion operations allocate a 2500
byte array and overwrite it with zeroes. We then insert this value into the data
structure. Lookup operations lookup a previously inserted key and read all of the
bytes associated with the value. Deletion operations free previously inserted keys
and free (but do not read) the value. These operations are performed sequentially by
a single process. Our sequence of insertions and deletions ensure that approximately
1,000,000 keys are present in the dictionary at all times. needs to
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Parameter Space The performance of all systems depends on the frequency of
snapshotting, the read vs. write mixture of the workload, and the access distribu-
tion. Towards this end, we evaluate performance while varying all of these parame-
ters. For snapshot frequency, we either performed a commit after a certain number
of insert or delete operations are performed (10, 500, or 1000 writes) or a period
of time has passed (100, 500, or 1000 milliseconds). We also varied the fraction of
write operations (0% . . . 50%) during the experiments.
We vary the workload by choosing keys either uniformly at random or from
the a Zipf distribution. The code that generates the Zipf distribution and its default
parameter are both taken directly from memcached benchmarks [85]. Finally, we
also experimented with varying the number of cores that simultaneously try to
persist data.
Our full evaluation spanned the Cartesian product of multiple snapshot fre-
quencies, write proportions between commit calls, trackers employed, key distri-
butions, thread count, and data structure implementations. In the following, we
present representative results from both microbenchmarks and end-to-end applica-
tion evaluations. We frame the results around a set of high-level questions, which
we pose and address in each of the following sections.
3.3.2 PTx versus PDMK
The first set of questions we seek to address is “How does PTx compare to









































Figure 3.2: Queries per second (in thousands) as a function of write frequency,
with the PMDK provided red black tree implementation and Zipf distributed work-
load,commit every 100 ms
of PMDK data structures’ explicit write set specifications? While instead using
automated write set tracking techniques?” To answer these questions, we perform
micro-benchmarks of the NVRAM-specific data structures provided by PMDK.
In the following, the “mmap unsafe” configuration is one where NVRAM is
mapped directly into application memory and the commit call is mapped to the
POSIX msync call. This configuration is unsafe as msync does not provide atomic
writes, which can lead to inconsistent data if the process faults or the machine
crashes during the msync. The “pmdk manual” configuration is stock PMDK, which
requires manual annotation of write sets. The PTx configurations replace the PMDK
writeback mechanism. ‘ptx manual” uses PMDK’s manual annotations, whereas the
other PTx configurations uses automatic write set trackers.
Figure 3.2 shows the queries per second with the PMDK red black tree while
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varying the write proportion and choosing keys from a Zipf distribution. Commits
are performed every 100 ms. The read-only workload shows the base overhead of
using a persistence library and performing periodic snapshots when no data is ac-
tually being modified. The DRAM column in the figure shows the throughput of
the PMDK red black tree without NVRAM, i.e., the data structure is mapped to
DRAM and commit is not invoked. (We have performed similar experiments with
other PMDK data structures and access distributions: these results are representa-
tive.)
For the read-only workload, all PTx configurations provide 2X or more through-
put than either pmdk manual or mmap unsafe. In fact, query throughput of PTx
configurations are on par with DRAM since, by design, PTx performs read op-
erations entirely in DRAM. Both pmdk manual and mmap unsafe map NVRAM
directly into application memory, and read-only throughput suffers due to the 3.7X
higher read latency of NVRAM. Performance degrades by only 2X (not 3.7X) be-
cause caching masks read latency, especially with a skewed workload. The result
also shows that invoking commit every 100 milliseconds does not appreciably degrade
performance when no data is modified.
As the fraction of writes increases, the slower NVRAM writes make the query
throughput fall behind the throughput achieved with DRAM. Depending on the
workload and application requirements/semantics, however, a persistent data struc-
ture can approach the performance of DRAM. While not shown in the figure, e.g., 2%
writes and a snapshot once per second performs on par with DRAM. We also observe









































Figure 3.3: Queries per second (in thousands) with the PMDK provided red black
tree implementation and Zipf distributed workload with 2% clustered by writes per
snapshot or milliseconds per snapshot.
write sets are very small (e.g., dirty bits for 10 writes/snapshot). In particular,
while determining the write set, dirty bits iterates over the page tables for the entire
allocated region and flushes the TLB, making it unsuitable for this type of workload.
In general, less frequent snapshots allow automatic trackers to amortize the cost of
finding write sets. With dirty bits, PTx outperforms or matches the performance
of PMDK and even the unsafe mmap, and nearly matches the performance of PTx
with manual tracking even for small write sets on this workload.
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 show queries per second with the PMDK red black
tree while varying snapshot frequency and choosing keys from a Zipf distribution
with 2% and 5% writes respectively. With 2% writes, page faults have the higher
throughput for very frequent transactions. This is unsurprising. Detecting modifi-









































Figure 3.4: Queries per second (in thousands) with the PMDK provided red black
tree implementation and Zipf distributed workload with 5% clustered by writes per
snapshot or milliseconds per snapshot.
thus, constant. Detecting modifications via page faults is a function of the number
of modified pages. This form of detection is expensive (two context switches and
system call must be invoked per page written). The implication is that frequent
transactions with few writes may have higher throughput when using page faults
to detect modifications, but as transaction frequency increases the constant cost of
dirty bit detection is amortized and performs better than all other automated forms
of tracking.
While PTx performs well in these experiments, perhaps its most enabling
feature is its ability to seamlessly persist any existing data structure without source
code change, including those that were not developed with persistence as a goal. We
explore this aspect of PTx next.
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3.3.3 PTx on existing data structures
The next question we seek to answer is “How does PTx perform when used to
provide persistence for unmodified data structures from the standard C++ library?”
PTx can atomically persist existing data structures without changing or even nec-
essarily having access to the source code. Any data structure library that takes
a memory allocator as input can be persisted without source code change or even
re-compilation. The application passes the library an allocator for a colored region,
and invokes commit as application semantics demand. The C++ standard template
library can be parameterized with an allocator, and we use it evaluate PTx using
the C++ red black tree and hash tree structures.
In addition to the automatic trackers we evaluated previously, this set of eval-
uations also include gcc-STM, which is source compatible with the C++ STL. gcc-
STM uses GCC’s built in STM support modified to supply compiler-generated an-
notations to PTx.
Figure 3.5 shows the performance of the C++ red black tree with 2% writes
and keys chosen from the Zipf distribution described earlier. We varied the commit
frequency and corresponding write set sized from 10 to 1000 writes and then from
100ms to 1000ms, respectively. The trends are similar to the earlier results using
the PMDK structures but the absolute query throughput is up to 2.5X higher. This
is likely because the C++ STL data structures are highly optimized, and PTx is
able to take advantage of these optimizations without any modification to the source





































Figure 3.5: Queries per second with the C++ red-black tree implementation from
a Zipf distributed workload with 2% writes.
results, shown in Figure 3.6.
Write set tracking based on dirty bits performs best except for very small
write sets of 10, where page faults are fastest. gcc-STM performs best for very small
transactions but is not competitive otherwise. This is because once a transaction is
started, gcc-STM tracks every load and store, not just accesses to the colored region.
Once again, with larger snapshots (500ms or longer), the cost of PTx automatic
marking is amortized, and PTx provides ∼90% of DRAM throughput. There is no
free lunch however, as write heavy or snapshot heavy workloads expose inherent
NVRAM bottlenecks.
In summary, PTx can provide persistence for existing, unmodified standard
data structures with high performance, approaching that of DRAM for large trans-









































Figure 3.6: Queries per second with the C++ hashtable implementation from a Zipf
distributed workload with 2% writes.
for very small transactions, where gcc-STM is best.
3.3.4 Multi-core scalability
We have also performed experiments to evaluate “How does PTx’s performance
scale with concurrent threads?” The single core experiments we have discussed are
affected by the longer NVRAM read/write latency, but a single core is unable to
saturate the NVRAM bandwidth. To determine whether or not PTx suffered from
any unexpected scaling anomalies, we evaluate the same data structures as before
with varying numbers of threads bound to different cores. Each thread executes the
same workload and operates independently.
The query performance of PTx and PMDK as the number of cores/threads is
increased is linear. When using a 5% mix of writes, and a commit every 500 writes,
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PTx scaled with a normalized co-efficient of 1 for the PMDK provided red-black tree
and the C++ red-black tree, regardless of the workload distribution. However, Zipf
distributed workloads did have higher absolute throughput by roughly 40%. PMDK
also scaled linearly, but with a co-efficient of .91 for a uniformly distributed workload
and a co-efficient of .86 for Zipf distributed workloads, with Zipf outperforming
PMDK by 40-50%.
There are two key points: First, PTx shows no unexpected scaling anomalies,
with performance increasing essentially linearly up to 24 cores on this workload.
Second, PTx scales better than PMDK: we hypothesize this is is due to PMDK’s
increased interactions with the NVRAM memory bus. Also, as expected, the Zipf
distributions for both PMDK and PTx are able to benefit from DRAM caching,
and provide higher absolute performance. (Even though our test machine has 48
cores, we did not scale beyond 24 since each CPU only has 24 cores, and both the
NVRAM and DRAM were local to the CPU we ran the tests on.)
3.3.5 Applications with persistent state
Next, we address the question “How does PTx, when used to provide persis-
tence for a standard C++ library hashtable, compare to a custom PMDK hashtable,
and to LMBD, on the same workload? How is the comparison influenced by how of-
ten state is persisted?” Our previous evaluations have focused on microbenchmarks
of data structure libraries. We compare PTx’s performance to mature application
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Figure 3.7: Queries per second with the C++ and PMDK-provided red-black tree
implementation, 2% write workload, with 500 writes between commit calls
Memory-Mapped Database (LMDB) [83], version 1.8. LMDB is a database de-
signed for read-heavy workloads, permitting only a single writer at a time. Inter-
nally, LMDB stores data as a memory mapped b-tree. Reads operate directly over
this memory mapped tree, whereas writes are propagated to the underlying file in
a ACID compliant manner. We ran LMDB on an SSD, on a NVRAM file system
with direct mapping, and on a NVRAM filesystem without direct mapping. The
last configuration allows LMDB’s memory mapped btree to be cached in DRAM,
and had the best query throughput, faster than the direct mapped version by 20%
and 3X-5X faster than LMDB over SSD (state of the art without NVRAM.)
Figure 3.8 shows the best performing configuration of LMDB and PTx with
manual and automatic marking using the C++ hashtable, on a workload with 500









































Figure 3.8: Queries per second with 500 writes / commit from a uniformly distributed
workload varying write proportion.
comparison. We performed these experiments with varying query distributions and
write fractions, and the results presented are representative. (In all cases, the test
inputs are identical for each system, and the information persisted is also the same
for each configuration.) For PMDK and ptx manual, the results show the PMDK
hash table data structure as it had the highest throughput for both systems. For au-
tomatic tracking, the C++ hash table data structure had highest throughput using
the dirty bits marking. LMDB internally uses a btree tree with manual annotation.
LMDB performs well in the low write-mix scenarios it is optimized for (2%
writes), outperforming PTx with manual marking by about 10% in both configura-
tions. As the write mix increases, PTx with manual marking performs similar to
LMDB. Invoking commit every 10 mutations (not shown), with very small modified
sets, over a large data structure with 1M keys, represents an extreme worst case
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for automatic tracking, and it lags manual marking by 20-30%. (PTx automatic
tracking remains competitive with PMDK manual marking, however.) With larger
write sets, PTx with automatic tracking performs much better, and is comparable
to both LMDB and PTx manual marking.
We parameterized the experiment in Figure 3.8 to focus on the absolute worst
case scenarios for PTx: no query locality, very small write sets, and very frequent
commits. It is interesting that PTx remains competitive even under these constraints,
especially since both PMDK and LMDB have the advantage of implementing manual
marking and writeback over a custom-built, optimized data structure, while PTx is a
generic persistence library applied in this experiment to a standard C++ data struc-
ture not designed for persistence. The small write sets in these experiments cause
a commit to be invoked multiple times per millisecond , providing very fine-grained
persistence at the cost of query throughput. Next we consider how performance is
affected when the persistence requirements are less fine-grained.
Figure 3.9 compares the performance of PTx, PMDK, LMDB, to two DRAM-
only data structures: Redis’ dictionary, and the C++ STL hashtable. Redis is a key
value store, but in this experiment we only evaluated its hash table separate from the
network front-end and query processor. (We present an evaluation of full end-to-end
Redis and variants in the next section.) PTx uses the C++ STL hashtable, with
dirty bits automatic tracking. PMDK uses its hashtable, LMDB its btree, and both
employ manual marking. The commit interval ranges from 100 ms to 32 seconds.
PTx with fully automatic marking is competitive with the Redis data structure
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Figure 3.9: Queries per second (relative to DRAM) with the C++ STL hashtable,
dirty bits tracker with a 25% write workload generated from uniformly distribution
keys. For comparison, we also include the throughput of PMDK and LMDB, both of
which require manual annotation, and of the Redis hash table, without persistence.
longer commit intervals. For all commit intervals in the plot, PTx with automatic
marking outperforms PMDK and LMDB, both of which are optimized for manual
marking. In fact, if we persist every 8 seconds, PTx with automatic marking, for the
same data structure, with no source code changes, provides 90% the query throughput
of running directly on DRAM, and achieves over 98% of DRAM throughput with 32
second commits. (As we’ve shown earlier, PTx can approach DRAM much quicker
if the proportion of writes in a transaction is smaller.)
3.3.6 Persistent key-value store performance
Next, we address the question “How does PTx, when used as a persistence
backend for Redis, compare to native Redis, to Pmem-Redis (a version of Redis
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designed for use with NVRAM), and to a simple custom kvs servers that relies on a
standard C++ hashtable, backed by PTx for persistence?” Our previous evaluation
showed the performance of persisting state for various data structures used within
a single process. We next evaluate the performance of a key value server that
receives operations from a client and periodically persists the data structure. We
evaluated five different systems, stock Redis with no persistence, stock Redis with
an append-only log written to an NVRAM file system, Redis-pmem, Redis-PTx,
and a custom written key value server that uses C++ hash tables and PTx for
persistence. Redis-pmem is a version of Redis modified to store large values in
persistent memory. Redis-PTx is our modified version of Redis, which uses PTx as
its persistence backend.
Table 3.2 shows the performance of each system under a uniform key distri-
bution with 2500 byte values. 25% of operations modified the data structure. Each
system was pinned to a single core and persisted state once per second. Redis-PTx
used dirty-bit based automatic tracking. We also evaluated other configurations
(different key sizes, access distributions, read-write mix), and these results are rep-
resentative.
Stock Redis using NVRAM as the file system was the best performing variant.
Under this configuration, Redis writes each operation to an append-only disk and
periodically calls fsync. Pmem-Redis also writes an append-only log to disk, but
it writes larger values to NVRAM. This reduces memory pressure by removing
large values from DRAM, but absent memory pressure, similar performance can be
achieved by just storing the Redis append-only log on the NVRAM file system and
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writing to it through the file system API.
System QPS lines
Redis (no persistence) 166,471 0
Redis (NVRAM disk) 108,485 0
Redis-pmem 106,074 4,382
Redis-PTx 106,808 291
custom-PTx 345,881 428 (full server SLOC)
Table 3.2: Queries/second achieved with 1 second persistence for Redis, persisting
its write-ahead log to disk, Redis-pmem, Redis using PTx as a backend, and a
custom key value server using PTx and the C++ hash table implementation. Lines
is the source code lines changed relative to stock Redis.
In our experiments, Redis’ overhead was dominated by request parsing. To
fully expose the overhead of persisting state, we wrote a custom key value server
with a compatible C client API and similar semantics. Our custom protocol al-
lowed for higher throughput without persistence (649K RPS), which gave us more
headroom to evaluate PTx in an integrated application. With one second commit
intervals, PTx significantly outperform every other configuration. We performed
additional experiments with more frequent commits and found that Redis-PTX ex-
ceeds or meets Redis-pmem’s performance even when committing every 10 millisec-
onds (100X as frequently as Redis-pmem) between key modifications. Our custom
key-value server also enables easy instrumentation to measure write amplification.
(Such a measurement is otherwise difficult, e.g., in pmem-redis, because of how per-
vasive the source code changes are, and the various different parts of the code where
NVRAM is accessed.) For the configurations we evaluated, regardless of commit
interval, PTx achieved an average write amplification of approximately 8.4%.
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Figure 3.10: Queries per second (in thousands) of our custom key-value server as a
function of commit frequency and value distribution
domized or constant. The results are shown in Figure 3.10. With constant values,
areas of the heap that are reused are more likely to be written but unmodified.
PTx will detect that the pages have not been modified and will not write the writ-
ten pages to NVRAM. With fully randomized values, little to no NVRAM writes
will be prevented by deduplication. As expected, constant values result in higher
throughput, but this difference narrows as commit frequency increases. We expect
that with constant values, the probability that the allocator will allocate memory
that has not been modified between transactions increase as transaction size in-
creases. In all cases, the throughput between random and constant values is within
the margin of error.
PTx offers strong performance, when compared to DRAM and to existing ma-
ture systems, such as Redis and LMDB, is a remarkable result in context. Conven-
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tional wisdom, based on microbenchmarks, points to NVRAM as a storage medium
that is faster than SSDs; in contrast, we show that NVRAM used with PTx promises
an alternative that provides throughput comparable to DRAM, and often faster than
existing customized protocols, while simultaneously providing consistency and per-
sistence, without onerous programmer effort to ensure correctness. NVRAM with
PTx can be thought of as executing at a configurable fraction of native DRAM
speeds, with a commensurate “lag” in persistence. This observation enables a pre-
viously unavailable form of programming “durable” data structures that are at once
performant, and relieving the development cycle from being burdened by the rigors
of “annotating” changes, or optimizing data structures for different storage media.
3.4 Conclusion
PTx provides a powerful, high-level abstraction, but its implementation re-
quires access to low-level abstractions that are not provided by POSIX. The pri-
mary high-level abstraction that PTx needs to circumvent is the buffer cache used
for memory mapped files. The buffer cache loads file state into DRAM for reading
or writing by the application before flushing to disk either when driven by some OS
heuristic (e.g., memory pressure) or when explicitly flushed via a msync call. This
abstraction is not suitable for PTx, both due to correctness and performance limita-
tions. Data is flushed to persistent media (in this case, NVRAM) at unpredictable
times, making it difficult to provide atomic semantics, and data corresponding to
the same region of memory is potentially flushed multiple times within a transac-
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tion and at inappropriate granularities, hampering performance. PTx circumvents
this by taking advantage of a new low-level abstraction introduced specifically for
NVRAM: direct access to the data pages for a memory mapped file. This solution
is safe, so long as the file system does not reallocate data blocks while the file is
memory mapped. Maintaining this restriction requires some care for the file system,
such as ensuring that all blocks are pre-allocated and fixed when a file is memory
mapped, but this low-level access is sufficient to implement PTx efficiently. We dis-
cuss further optimizations that would be possible under the null-Kernel architecture
in Section 5.4.
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Chapter 4: Light-weight Contexts
In this chapter we discuss Light-Weight Contexts (lwCs), which is a new ab-
straction that decouples memory isolation, execution state, and privilege separation
from within a process.
4.1 Introduction
Processes abstract the unit of isolation, privilege, and execution state in general-
purpose operating systems. Computations that require memory isolation, privilege
separation, or continuations at the OS level must be run in separate processes1.
Unfortunately, switching and communicating between processes incurs the cost of
invoking the kernel scheduler, resource accounting, context-switching, and IPC. The
actual hardware-imposed cost of isolation and privilege separation, however, is much
smaller: if the TLB is tagged with an address space identifier, then switching context
requires as little as a system call and loading a CPU register.
Just as threads separate the unit of execution from a process, we assert that
there is benefit to decoupling memory isolation, execution state, and privilege sepa-
1Language runtimes can provide these properties at the expense of additional overhead, lan-
guage dependence, and an increased trusted computing base.
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ration from processes. We show that it is possible to isolate memory and privileges,
and maintain multiple execution states within a process with low overhead, thus
streamlining common computation patterns and enabling more efficient and safe
code.
We introduce a new first-class OS abstraction: the light-weight context (lwC).
A process may contain multiple lwCs, each with their own virtual memory mappings,
file descriptor bindings, and credentials. Optionally and selectively, lwCs may share
virtual memory regions, file descriptors and credentials.
lwCs are not schedulable entities: they are completely orthogonal to threads
that may execute within a process. Thus, a thread may start in lwC a, and then
invoke a system call to switch to lwC b. Such a switch atomically changes the
VM mappings, file table entries, permissions, instruction and stack pointers of the
thread. Indeed multiple threads may execute simultaneously within the same lwC.
lwCs maintain per-thread state to ensure a thread that enters a lwC resumes at the
point where it was created or last switched out of the lwC.
lwCs enable a range of new in-process capabilities, including fast roll-back,
protection rings (by credential restriction), session isolation, and protected com-
partments (using VM and resource mappings). These can be used to implement
efficient in-process reference monitors to check security invariants, to isolate com-
ponents of an app that deal with encryption keys or other private information, or
to efficiently roll back the process state.
We have implemented lwCs within the FreeBSD 11.0 kernel. The prototype
shows that it is possible to implement lwCs in a production OS efficiently. Our
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experience with implementing and retrofitting large applications such as Apache and
nginx with lwCs has taught us that it is possible to introduce many new capabilities,
such as rollback and secure data compartments, to existing production code with
minimal overhead.
In this chapter we do the following:
• We introduce lwCs, a first-class OS abstraction that extends the POSIX API,
and present common coding patterns demonstrating its different uses.
• We describe an implementation of lwCs within FreeBSD, and show how lwCs
can be used to implement efficient session isolation in production web servers, both
process-oriented (Apache, via roll-back) and event-driven (nginx, via memory iso-
lation). We show how efficient snapshotting can provide session isolation while
improving performance on web-based applications using a PHP-based MVC ap-
plication on nginx. We show how cryptographic libraries such as OpenSSL can
efficiently create isolated data compartments within a process to render sensitive
data (such as private keys) immune to external attacks (e.g., buffer overruns a la
Heartbleed [35]). Finally, we show how lwCs can efficiently implement in-process
reference monitors, again for industrial-scale servers such as Apache and nginx, that
can introspect on system calls and memory.
• We evaluate lwCs using a range of micro-benchmarks and application scenarios.
Our results show that existing methods for session isolation are often slower than
lwCs. Other common uses such as lwC-supported sensitive data compartments and
reference monitoring have little to negligible overhead on production servers. Finally,
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Function Return Value System Call
Create lwC {new, caller, args} ← lwCreate(resource-spec, options)
Switch to lwC {caller, args} ← lwSwitch(target, args)
Resource access status ← lwRestrict(l, resource-spec)
status ← lwOverlay(l, resource-spec)
status ← lwSyscall(target, mask, syscall, syscall-args)
Table 4.1: API for interacting with lwCs. Parameters in italics new, caller, . . .
are lwC descriptors. Arguments args are passed during lwC switches; resource-
spec denotes resources (e.g. memory pages, file descriptors) that can be shared or
narrowed.
we show that using the lwC snapshot capability to quickly launch an initialized PHP
runtime can improve the performance of a production server.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: we discuss related work in
Section 2.2 and describe the lwC abstraction, API, and design in Section 4.2. We
present common lwC coding patterns in Section 4.3. We describe our FreeBSD
implementation of lwCs in Section 3.3, and present an experimental evaluation in
Section 4.4.
4.2 lwC design
lwCs are separate units of isolation, privilege, and execution state within a
process. Each lwC has its own virtual address space, set of page mappings, file
descriptor bindings, and credentials. Threads and lwCs are independent. Within a
process, a thread executes within one lwC at a time and can switch between lwCs.
lwCs are named using file descriptors. Each process starts with one root lwC, which
has a well-known file descriptor number.
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Table 4.1 shows the lwC API. A lwC may create a new (child) lwC using the
lwCreate operation and receive the child’s file descriptor. If a context a has a valid
descriptor for lwC c, a thread executing inside a may switch to c using the lwSwitch
operation. A lwC c is terminated (and its resources released) when the last lwC with
a descriptor for c closes the descriptor. Common usage patterns of the lwC API will
be shown in Section 4.3.
4.2.1 Creating lwCs
The lwCreate call creates a new (child) lwC in the current process. The
operation’s default semantics are similar to that of a POSIX fork, in that the child
lwC’s initial state is an identical copy of the calling (parent) lwC’s state, except
for its descriptor. Unlike with fork, however, child and parent lwC share the same
process id, and no new thread is created. No execution takes place in the new lwC
until an existing thread switches to it.
lwCreate returns the descriptor of the new child lwC new to the parent lwC
with the caller descriptor set to -1. When a thread switches to the new lwC (new)
for the first time, the lwCreate call returns with the caller’s lwC descriptor in caller
and the parent’s lwC descriptor in new, along with any arguments from the caller
in args.
By default, the new lwC gets a private copy of the calling lwC’s state at the
time of the call, including per-thread register values, virtual memory, file descriptors,
and credentials. Shared memory regions in the calling lwC are shared with the new
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lwC. The parent lwC may modify the visibility of its resources to the child lwC using
the resource-spec argument, described in Section 4.2.3.
The implementation does not stop other threads executing in the parent lwC
during an lwCreate. To ensure that the child lwC reflects a consistent snapshot
of the parent’s state, all threads that are active in the parent at the time of the
lwCreate therefore should be in a consistent state. The application may achieve
this, for instance, by barrier synchronizing such threads with the thread that calls
lwCreate. A thread that does not exist in the parent lwC at the time of the
lwCreate may not switch to the child in the future.
The lwCreate call takes several option flags. LWC SHAREDSIGNALS controls sig-
nal handling in the child lwC, as described in Section 4.2.7. LWC SYSTRAP indicates
that any system calls for which the child does not hold the required OS capability
should be redirected to its parent. This feature enables a parent to interpose and
mediate its child’s system call activity, as described in Section 4.2.6.
The fork semantics of lwCreate enable the convenient, language independent
creation of lwCs based on the current state of the calling lwC. No additional APIs
are required to initialize a new lwC. The new lwC can be viewed also as a snapshot
of the state of the caller at the time of invoking lwCreate, enabling the caller to
revert to this state in the future.
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4.2.2 Switching between lwCs
The lwSwitch operation switches the calling thread to the lwC with descriptor
target, passing args as parameters. lwSwitch retains the state of the calling thread
in the present lwC. When this lwC is later switched back into by the same thread,
the call returns with the switching lwC available as caller and arguments passed in
args.
Note that returns from a lwSwitch and lwCreate, any signal handlers that
were installed, and the instruction pointer locations of threads in a parent lwC at
the time of a lwCreate define the only possible entry points into a lwC. (The root
lwC has an additional one-time entry point when the process is launched.)
lwSwitch is semantically equivalent to a coroutine yield. In fact, as far as
control transfer is concerned, lwCs can be viewed as isolated and privilege separated
coroutines. Recall that a procedure is a special case of a coroutine. To achieve
a (remote) procedure call among lwCs, the called procedure, when done, simply
switches to its caller and then loops back to its beginning. This functionality can
be provided easily as part of a library.
4.2.3 Static resource sharing
When a lwC is created using lwCreate, the child lwC receives a copy-on-
write snapshot of all its parent’s resources by default. The parent can modify
this behavior using the resource-spec argument in the lwCreate operation. The
resource-spec is an array of C unions: each array element specifies either a range of
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file descriptors, virtual memory addresses, or credentials. For each range, one of the
following sharing options can be specified. LWC COW: the child receives a logical copy
of the range of resource (the default). LWC SHARED: the range of resources is shared
among parent and child. LWC UNMAP: the range of resources is not mapped from the
parent into the child. (The child may subsequently map different resources in the
address range.)
When restricting the resources inherited by the child, care must be taken to
minimally pass on the stacks, code, synchronization variables, and other dependen-
cies of all threads in the parent lwC, to ensure predictable behavior if these threads
switch to the child in the future.
4.2.4 Dynamic resource sharing
A lwC may dynamically map (overlay) resources from another lwC into its
address space using the lwOverlay operation. The caller specifies which regions of
a given resource type (file descriptor or memory) are to be overlayed, and whether
the specified region should be copied or shared, in the resource-spec parameter. The
lwOverlay call will only succeed if the caller lwC holds access capabilities (described
below in Section 4.2.5) for the requested resources. A successful lwOverlay opera-




Access capabilities are associated with lwC file descriptors. Each lwC holds
a descriptor with a universal access capability for itself. When a lwC is created,
its parent receives a descriptor with a universal access capability for the child. A
parent lwC may grant a child lwC access capabilities for the parent lwC selectively
by marking resource ranges as LWC MAY ACCESS in the resource-spec argument passed
to the lwCreate call.
Access capabilities may be restricted on a lwC descriptor with the lwRestrict
call. The resource-spec parameter restricts the set of resources that may be overlayed
or accessed by any context that holds the lwC descriptor l. The valid resource types
are file descriptors, virtual memory addresses, and syscall numbers. Subsequent to
the call, the descriptor will allow lwOverlay to succeed for any file descriptors and
memory addresses, and lwSyscall for any syscalls, respectively, that are within the
intersection of the resource-spec set and whatever capabilities l had previous to the
call.
4.2.6 System call interposition/emulation
Consider an lwC C that was created with the LWC SYSTRAP flag. If a thread
in C invokes a system call for which C does not hold a capability according to the
OS’s sandboxing mechanism, the thread is switched to its parent lwC instead, if
the thread exists in the parent (if the thread does not exist in the parent, the call
fails with an error). When the thread is resumed in the parent lwC as a result of
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a faulting syscall by the child, the arguments in the switch contain the system call
number attempted and the arguments passed to it. The parent can choose to decline
the syscall and return an error to the child, or perform a syscall on behalf of the
child, possibly with different arguments (see below). To signal the completion of
the child’s system call, the thread executing in the parent lwC switches back to the
child with the return value and any error code as arguments to the switch call.
An authorized lwC may perform a syscall on behalf of another lwC target
using the lwSyscall operation. The lwSyscall succeeds if the lwC calling the
operation holds an access capability (see Section 4.2.5) for the target and syscall,
and holds the OS credentials required to perform the requested syscall. The effects
of a successful execution of lwSyscall are as if the target had executed the requested
syscall, except that it returns to the calling context. The mask parameter allows
the caller to modify this behavior by specifying aspects of its own context that are
to be put in place for the duration of the system call. Specifically, the caller may
specify that the target’s file table, memory space, credentials, or any combination
be replaced by the caller’s equivalent for the duration of the call. This allows the
efficient implementation of useful patterns, such as enabling a untrusted lwC to read
(or append) a fixed number of bytes from (to) a protected file without having access
to the file descriptor.
4.2.7 Signal handling
lwCs modify the standard POSIX signal handling semantics in the following
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way. We distinguish between attributable signals, which can be attributed to the
execution of a particular instruction in a lwC, and non-attributable signals, which
cannot. Attributable signals, such as SIGSEGV or SIGFPE, are delivered to the lwC
that caused the signal immediately. Non-attributable signals, such as SIGKILL or
SIGUSR1, are delivered to the root lwC and any lwCs in the process that were created
with the LWC SHARESIGNALS option by a parent lwC that is able to receive such
signals. A non-attributable signal is delivered to a lwC upon the next switch to the
lwC.
4.2.8 System call semantics
lwCs modify the behavior of some existing POSIX system calls. During a
fork, all lwCs in the calling process are duplicated in the child process. Any mem-
ory regions that were mmap’ed as MAP SHARED in some lwCs of the calling process
are shared with the corresponding lwCs in the new child process, within and across
the two processes. Any memory regions that are shared among lwCs in the parent
process using the LWC SHARED option in lwCreate are shared among the corre-
sponding lwCs within the child process only. An exit system call in any lwC of a
process terminates the entire process.
4.2.9 lwC isolation
Because lwCs do not have access to the state of each others’ memory, file de-
scriptors, and capabilities unless explicitly shared, they can provide strong isolation
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and privilege separation within a process. Since lwCs share executable threads,
however, an application needs to make certain assumptions about the behavior of
other lwCs in the same process, even if they don’t share resources and don’t have
overlay capabilities for each other. Specifically, a lwC can block or execute a thread
indefinitely or terminate the process prematurely by invoking exit.
We believe these assumptions are reasonable in practice because the lwCs of a
process are part of the same application program. Denial-of-service within a process
is self-defeating. On the other hand, lwCs can reliably prevent accidental leakage of
private information across user sessions, isolate authentication credentials and other
secrets, and ensure the integrity of a reference monitor.
A lwC can learn about certain activities of other lwCs by registering for non-
attributable signals. An application that wishes to limit information flow across
lwCs should create lwCs without the LWC SHARESIGNALS option (the default).
4.2.10 lwC security
lwCs provide isolation and privilege separation within a process, but include
powerful mechanisms for sharing and control among the lwCs of a process. There-
fore, it is important to understand the threat model and the security properties
provided by the lwC abstraction.
Threat model We assume that the kernel is trustworthy and uncompromised,
and that the tool chain used to build, link, and load the application does not have
exploitable vulnerabilities that can be used to hijack control before main() starts.
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When a lwC is created, its parent has universal privileges on the lwC. Consequently,
the security of a lwC assumes that its parent (and, by transitivity, all its ancestors)
cannot be hijacked to abuse these privileges. In practice, the parent should drop
all unnecessary privileges on the child immediately after the child is created, so
this assumption is needed only with respect to the remaining privileges. When an
application uses dynamic sharing, the same assumption must be extended to all
lwCs that obtain privileges indirectly. The lwC API does not enable any inter-
process communication or sharing beyond the standard POSIX API. Consequently,
no new assumptions regarding lwCs in other processes are needed.
Security properties The properties of a lwC are constrained by the properties
of the process in which it exists. A lwC cannot attain privileges that exceed those
of its process, and the confidentiality and integrity properties of any lwC cannot
be weaker than those of its process. The properties of the root lwC are those of
the process. In applications that do not use dynamic sharing, the privileges of a
non-root lwC are bounded by those of its parent and, transitively, by those of its
ancestors; its integrity and confidentiality cannot be weaker than those of any of its
ancestors. In applications that use dynamic sharing through the exchange of access
capabilities via a common ancestor, the integrity (confidentiality) of a lwC depends
on all siblings and descendants that have write (read) rights to it. For this reason,
dynamic sharing should be used with caution.
In typical patterns of privilege separation, the root lwC should run a high-
assurance component, i.e., one that is simple, heavily scrutinized, and exports a
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narrow interface. A component that protects sensitive state is at or near the root,
to minimize its dependencies. More complex, less stable, network or user-facing
components should be encapsulated in de-privileged lwCs at the leaves of a process’s
lwC tree and should execute with the least privileges required.
4.3 Common lwC usage patterns
In this section, we illustrate lwC use patterns for snapshots, isolation and
protection rings. For some of the patterns, we use a web server as an illustrative
setting. However, all the patterns are broadly applicable.
Snapshot and rollback A common lwC use pattern is snapshot and rollback,
where a service process (such as a server worker process) initializes its state to the
point where it is ready to serve requests (or sessions), snapshots this state, serves
a request and rolls its state back to the snapshot before serving the next request.
As compared to a setup where the process manually cleans up request-specific state
after each request, the snapshot and rollback can improve performance by efficiently
discarding the request-specific state with a single call, and also improves security by
isolating sequential requests served by the same task from each other.
Algorithm 4 shows the pseudocode of a small library containing two functions—
snapshot() and rollback()—and a main() server function illustrating their use. The
server initializes its state and calls snapshot() on line 12 to create a snapshot. snap-
shot() duplicates the current lwC (copy-on-write) using lwCreate on line 2. The
descriptor of the duplicated snapshot, called new, is returned at line 4 and stored in
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the variable snap. The program serves the request and then, to reset its state, calls
rollback(). Control transfers to line 2 in the snap (the child) and then immediately
to line 6 where the original lwC is closed (its resources are reclaimed). The snap
recursively calls snapshot() (line 7). At line 2, it creates a duplicate of itself and
returns that duplicate to main() at line 12. The cycle then repeats, with snap and
its duplicate having taken the roles of the original lwC and the snap, respectively.
Algorithm 4 Snapshot and rollback
1: function snapshot()
2: new,caller,arg = lwCreate(default spec, . . . )





8: function rollback(snap) . never returns
9: lwSwitch(snap, 0)
10: function main()
11: ... . initialize state
12: snap = snapshot()
13: ... . serve request
14: rollback(snap)
. kills current lwC, continues at line 12 in snap
In our evaluation, we use this pattern to roll back the state of pre-forked worker
processes after each session in the Apache web server.
Isolating sessions in an event-driven server High throughput servers like
nginx handle several sessions in single-threaded processes using event-driven multi-
plexing. However, they provide no isolation among sessions within a process. This
shortcoming can be addressed using lwCs. Algorithm 5 illustrates the usage pattern.
The program defines a set of network socket descriptors to poll, one for each
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Algorithm 5 Event-driven server with session isolation
1: function serve request(retlwc, client)
2: loop
3: if would block(client) then
4: lwSwitch(retlwc, 0);





10: descriptors = { accept descriptor }
11: file2lwc map = { accept descriptor =¿ root }
12: loop
13: next = descriptors.ready()
14: if next = accept descriptor then
15: fd = accept(next)
16: descriptors.insert(fd)
17: specs = { ... } . Share fd descriptor only
18: new,caller,arg = lwCreate(specs, ...)
19: if caller = -1 then . context created
20: file2lwc map[fd] = new
21: else
22: serve request(root, fd)
23: else
24: lwc = file2lwc map[next]
25: from, done = lwSwitch(lwc, ...)




client connection, on line 10 and sets a mapping of the listening socket descriptor
to the current lwC on line 11.
Once a descriptor is ready the program moves past line 13 and either accepts
and encapsulates a new descriptor in a worker lwC or resumes execution of a previous
one that is now ready. In the former case, the worker’s lwC is created on line 18 such
that no descriptor other than fd is passed to it (line 17), the created lwC descriptor
is mapped on line 20 and the loop resumes. In the latter case, the previously mapped
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worker lwC is retrieved on line 24. This lwC is now immediately switched into on
the subsequent line. At this point execution resumes on line 18 in the worker. As a
result, it enters the serve request function on line 22.
When the worker is done executing it switches back into the root lwC. It uses
the lwSwitch argument to indicate whether it is done with its work (arg = 1) or
not (arg = 0). When it switches back to the root, control flow resumes at line 25.
Depending on the argument passed in from the worker, the root lwC either closes
the socket and the worker or leaves them intact for later service.
Since all worker lwCs obtain a private copy of the root’s state, no worker sees
session-specific state of other workers. This isolates the sessions from each other.
Sensitive data isolation A third common use pattern isolates sensitive data
within a process by limiting access to a single lwC that exposes only a narrow
interface. As an illustration, Algorithm 6 shows how to isolate a private signature
key that is available to a signing function, but kept hidden from the rest of the
(large and network-facing) program.
The main function initializes the program and loads the private signing key
into the variable privkey (line 11). Next, it calls lwCreate to create a second lwC
with the same initial state (line 13). The child lwC, which will become the isolated
compartment with access to the privkey, is granted the privilege to overlay any
part of the parent’s virtual memory.
The parent lwC continues executing on line 16, where it deletes its copy of the
private signing key and then revokes its privilege to overlay any part of the child
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Algorithm 6 Sensitive Data Isolation
1: function sign(key, data, out buffer)
2: function sign sstub(caller,arg)
3: loop
4: lwOverlay(caller,{VM,arg,sizeof(arg),SHARE})
5: sign(privkey, arg.in, arg.out)
6: lwOverlay(caller,{VM,arg,sizeof(arg),UNMAP})
7: caller,arg = lwSwitch(caller, 0)
8: function sign cstub(buf)
9: caller,res = lwSwitch(child, buf)
10: function main
11: ... . initialization, load privkey
12: child,caller,arg =
13: lwCreate({VM,0,MAX,MAY OVERLAY}, 0)
14: if caller != -1 then
15: sign sstub(caller,arg)
16: privkey = 0 . erase key





lwC’s memory. Any code executed in the parent after this point (line 17) has no way
to access the private key. When this code wishes to sign data, it calls SIGN CSTUB
passing as argument a structure that contains the data to sign and a large enough
buffer to hold the returned signature.
The SIGN CSTUB function performs a lwSwitch to the child lwC, passing a
pointer to the buffer as the argument. The first time the child is switched to, it
returns from lwCreate with caller != -1 and calls SIGN SSTUB (line 15), from which
it does not return.
SIGN SSTUB now uses lwOverlay to map the buffer from the parent lwC as a
shared region into its own address space (line 4), calls the SIGN function with the
private key, and then unmaps the buffer from its address space. Finally, the function
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calls lwSwitch to return control to the parent lwC, which resumes by returning from
the lwSwitch in line 9. Upon future invocations of SIGN CSTUB, the child lwC returns
from the lwSwitch in line 7 and loops back.
In our evaluation with web servers, we use this pattern to isolate parts of
the OpenSSL library that handle long-term private keys, thus protecting the keys
from vulnerabilities like the widespread Heartbleed bug [35]. (Heartbleed remains a
threat even after global key revocations and reissues [86,87].)
Protected reference monitor Next, we describe a pattern that allows a parent
lwC to intercept any subset of system calls made by its child and monitor those
calls. In our evaluation, we use this pattern to implement a reference monitor for
system calls made by the web server.
Algorithm 7 Reference Monitor
1: function monitor(child)
2: ,call = lwSwitch(child, NULL)
3: loop
4: if is allowed(call) then
5: spec = { type = CRED, SANDBOX }
6: rv = lwSyscall(child, spec,
call.num, call.params)
7: out.err,out.rv = errno, rv;
8: else
9: out.err,out.rv = EPERM, -1;
10: ,call = lwSwitch(child, out)
11: function main
12: specs = { ... } . Share (COW) all but private data
13: child,c, = lwCreate(specs, LWC SYSTRAP)
14: if c = -1 then . parent becomes refmon
15: monitor(child) . Never returns
16: privdrop() && run() . Child starts here
Algorithm 7 shows the pseudocode of the pattern for the case where the mon-
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itoring parent is the root lwC. On line 13, the root creates a child lwC but reserves a
private region, which may contain secrets (e.g., encryption keys) of which the child
is not allowed to get a copy. The child is created with the flag LWC SYSTRAP, so
any system calls that the child lacks the capability for trap to the root lwC. Once
the child lwC is created, the root lwC enters the monitoring function, which never
returns.
Within the monitoring function, the root, now acting as the reference monitor,
yields to the child immediately (line 2). The reference monitor regains control when
the child makes a system call that it does not have the capabilities for. The reference
monitor checks whether the call should be allowed (line 4) and, if so, makes the call
in the context of the child (line 6). It yields to the child with the system call’s result
and error code. If the system call should be disallowed, the reference monitor yields
to the child with error code EPERM. The reference monitor loops to handle the
next system call.
The child starts execution on line 16 where it immediately drops privileges for
all system calls that should be monitored. This causes all these system calls to trap
to the reference monitor, which handles them as described above.
For simplicity, our example reference monitor merely filters system calls, a
capability already provided by many operating systems. A more interesting mon-
itor could inspect the system call arguments or other parts of the child’s state by
overlaying in the appropriate regions, or perform arbitrary actions and system calls
on behalf of the child.
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4.4 Evaluation of lwCs
In this chapter, we evaluate lwCs using micro-benchmarks, and when applying
the usage patterns discussed in Section 4.3 in the context of the Apache and nginx
web servers. Our experiments were performed on Dell R410 servers, each with 2x
Intel Xeon X5650 2.66 GHz 6 core CPUs with both hyperthreading and SpeedStep
disabled, 48GB main memory, running FreeBSD 11.0 (AMD64) and OpenSSL 1.0.2.
The servers were connected via Cisco Nexus 7018 switches with 1Gbit Ethernet links.
Each server has a 1TB Seagate ST31000424SS disk formatted under UFS.
4.4.1 lwC switch
Table 4.2 compares the time to execute a lwSwitch call compared to context
switching between processes (using a semaphore), between kernel threads (using a
semaphore, which we found to be faster than a mutex), and user threads. The
user threads use the getcontext and setcontext calls specified by POSIX.1-2001.
A lwC switch takes less than half the time of a process or kernel thread switch.
The reason is that a lwC switch avoids the synchronization and scheduling required
for a process or thread context switch, instead requiring only a switch of the VM
mapping. Somewhat surprisingly, a kernel thread switch is on par with a process
context switch when both use the same form of synchronization. The reason is that
the kernel code executed during a switch between two kernel threads in the same
process or in different processes is largely the same.
User threads are only moderately faster than lwC switches, because in FreeBSD
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11, the user context switch is implemented by a system call. In Linux glibc, it is
instead implemented in userspace assembly. In an experiment with Linux 3.11.10
on the same hardware, user thread switches run in 6% of the time required by
semaphore-based kernel thread switches.
lwC process k-thread u-thread
2.01 (0.03) 4.25 (0.86) 4.12 (0.98) 1.71 (0.06)
Table 4.2: Median switch time (in microseconds) and standard deviation over ten
trials.
4.4.2 lwC creation
Next, we measured the total cost of creating, switching to, and destroying
lwCs with default arguments (all resources shared COW with the parent) within a
single process. When no pages are written in either the parent or child lwC during
the lifetime of the child, the system is able to create, switch into once, and destroy
an lwC in 87.7 microseconds on average, with standard deviation below 1%. This
result is independent of the amount of memory allocated to the process. Each page
written in either parent or child, however, causes a COW fault, which requires a
page frame allocation and copy. When 100, 1000, 10000, and 100000 pages are
written in the child during the experiment described above, the average total time
taken per lwC increases to 397, 3054, 35563, and 34182 microseconds, respectively.
Standard deviation was below 7% in all cases. The cost of maintaining a separate
lwC is approximately linearly dependent on the number of unique pages it creates,
and is lowest when lwCs in a process share most of their pages.
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The results of our microbenchmarks can be used to estimate the cost of using
lwCs in an application, given an estimate of the rate of lwC creations and switches,
and the number of unique pages in each lwC. Later in this section, we evaluate the
overhead of lwCs in the context of specific applications: Apache and nginx.
4.4.3 Reference monitoring
Following the pattern described in Section 4.3, we have implemented an in-
process reference monitor using lwCs. When a process starts, the reference moni-
tor gains control first and creates a child lwC, which executes the server applica-
tion. The child lwC is sandboxed using FreeBSD Capsicum and disallowed from
using certain system calls, which are instead redirected to the parent lwC using
the LWC SYSTRAP option. Our reference monitor restricts access to the filesys-
tem, though other policies that restrict any system call or inspect memory (using
lwOverlay) can readily be implemented within our basic schema. We compare the
lwC reference monitor (lwc-mon) to two other techniques:
Inline Monitoring (inline) This is a baseline scheme where the reference moni-
tor checks are inlined with the application code. The monitored process is LD PRELOADed
with a library that intercepts each system call and checks arguments. Inlining pro-
vides a lower bound on overhead, but does not provide security since the monitored
process can overwrite the checks or otherwise bypass the interception library.
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Process Separation (procsep) This method provides a secure reference monitor
in a separate process. The monitored process runs in a sandbox based on FreeBSD
Capsicum [88]: the sandbox ensures that the monitored process is unable to issue
prohibited system calls (e.g. open). At initialization, but prior to entering the
sandbox, the monitored process connects to the reference monitor process over a
Unix domain socket, which it can subsequently use to communicate with the refer-
ence monitor, even while sandboxed. All open calls (which the sandbox restricts)
must be vectored through this socket, which allows the reference monitor to inspect
and restrict the access as necessary. If the access is to be granted to the sandboxed
application, the reference monitor shares a file descriptor over the socket.
Figure 4.1 shows the overhead of monitoring open, read and write system
calls, while an application is accessing a file stored in an in-memory file system.
The application calls each system call 10,000 times and we report the average of
5 runs. Faster system calls have higher relative overhead since the fixed cost of
redirecting the system call has to be paid. lwc-mon does not require data copying
or IPC and hence outperforms procsep by a factor of two or more.
4.4.4 Apache
Modern web servers are designed to efficiently map user sessions to available
processing cores. For instance, the popular Apache HTTP server provides multi-
threading using kernel threads (threads) in one configuration and pre-forked pro-






























Figure 4.1: Cost of 10,000 monitored system calls in seconds (log scale). Error bars
show standard deviation.
such as nginx, use an event loop (based on kqueue or epoll) within a process, and
have the option of spawning multiple processes that map to cores, each with their
own event loop.
Consider the problem of isolating individual user sessions to separate the priv-
ileges of different user sessions or to implement per-user information flow control.
None of the above mentioned server configurations provide such isolation: multi-
threaded and event-driven configurations serve different sessions concurrently in
the same process; pre-forked processes sequentially share among different sessions.
Apache can be configured to fork a new process for each user session (fork), which
provides memory isolation and privilege separation. As our results demonstrate,
however, this configuration has low performance for small session lengths, due to
the overhead of forking processes2.
2In fact, we had to patch Apache (in server/mpm common.c) to continuously check the status
of child processes (rather than at 1s intervals) to get this configuration to perform at all at small






































Figure 4.2: Apache throughput in (GETs/sec) of 128 concurrent clients, 45 byte
docs, over HTTP. Error bars show standard deviation, which was below 3.7%.
lwCs can provide memory isolation, privilege separation, and high perfor-
mance. We have augmented the pre-fork mode in Apache (version 2.4.18) to provide
session isolation using the snapshot and rollback pattern from Section 4.3. Within
each Apache process, we create a lwC that serves a user session; when the session
ends, the lwC switches (reverts) to its initial (untainted) state before serving the
next user session, thereby ensuring the isolation property.
In the following set of experiments, we use ApacheBench (ab) to issue HTTP
and HTTPS requests to our Apache server. We modified ab to support varying
client session lengths by using HTTP Keepalive and terminating a session after
a certain number of requests. We launch a single ApacheBench instance which
repeatedly makes up to 128 concurrent requests for a small 45 byte document.




































Figure 4.3: Apache throughput in (GETs/sec) of 128 concurrent clients, 45 byte
docs, over HTTPS. Error bars show standard deviation, which was below 3.7%.
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show the number of GET requests served per second by
the different Apache configurations at different session lengths, and for HTTP and
HTTPS respectively. For HTTPS, the server uses TLSv1.2, ECDHE-RSA-AES256-
GCM-SHA384 with 4096 bit keys. The results were averaged over five runs of 60
seconds each.
At session length ∞, each client maintains a session for the duration of the
experiment. The threads and prefork configurations, which provide no isolation,
perform comparably for all session lengths and protocols. fork and lwc configura-
tions provide isolation: lwc has better throughput in all cases, and has a significant
advantage for short sessions (256 and below), particularly for HTTP. (In HTTPS,
the high CPU overhead for session establishment dominates overall cost; however,
emerging hardware support for crypto will diminish these costs, exposing once again
89
the costs of isolation.) Moreover, lwc achieves performance comparable to the best
configuration without isolation for sessions lengths of 256 and larger.
We also repeated the experiment with GET requests for 900 byte documents.
These documents are 20x larger but still small enough not to saturate the network
link. The trends and relative throughput between the different configuration were
very close to those in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, with the absolute peak throughput
within 10%.
We have integrated reference monitoring within Apache (and nginx). Fig-
ure 4.4 shows the throughput of Apache prefork in different reference monitor
configurations when used to serve short (45 byte) documents. The results were av-
eraged over five runs of 20 seconds each. In this experiment, the open and stat
system calls are monitored and checked against a whitelist of allowed directories.
These results show that a reference monitor implementation based on in-process lwC
incurs lower overhead than an implementation based on process separation even for
large applications where the monitored system calls constitute only part of what the
applications do. The overhead of reference monitoring increases with session length
due to the increase in relative number of reference monitored system calls (open and
stat) compared to other system calls (accept, read, send, close).
4.4.5 Nginx
To enable session isolation in nginx (version 1.9.15), we allocate a lwC for





































Figure 4.4: Throughput of different Apache reference monitoring configurations in
(GETs/sec) of 128 concurrent clients, 45 byte docs. Error bars show standard
deviation, which was below 2%.
following the session isolation pattern from Section 4.3. Note that in the nginx
case, each process may serve many different connections simultaneously, and our
implementation creates a lwC per active connection within the process. We have
also integrated a reference monitor with nginx.
We experiment with different nginx configurations: the stock nginx, lwc-
event augments nginx’s event loop to create a new lwC per connection, and lwc-
event-mon combines a reference monitor with the per-connection lwC. In each case
we configured nginx to use 10 worker processes, as we found that this had the best
performance. We launch four ApacheBench instances, each of which repeatedly
makes up to 75 concurrent requests for a small 45 byte document.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 shows the average number of queries served by each of the








































Figure 4.5: Nginx throughput in GETs/sec for HTTP requests with 10 workers, 45B
documents, 300 concurrent requests. Error bars show standard deviation, which was
below 0.9%.
The standard deviation did not exceed 0.9%.
nginx is considered the state of the art high-performance server. It uses a
highly optimized event loop and is about 2.88x quicker than Apache. Introducing
lwCs in this base configuration (named lwc-event in the results) has no significant
impact on the throughput of this high-performance configuration. Similarly, refer-
ence monitoring adds only minimal overhead. For both HTTP and HTTPS, with
isolation and reference monitoring, lwC-augmented nginx performs comparably to
native nginx.
Large scale servers may need to maintain tens of thousands of concurrent
user sessions. Using lwCs for session isolation increases the amount of per-session
state. Therefore, our next experiment explores how using lwCs for session isolation








































Figure 4.6: Nginx throughput in GETs/sec for HTTPS requests with 10 workers,
45B documents, 300 concurrent requests. Error bars show standard deviation, which
was below 0.9%.
We experimented with two configurations: in the first, we use between 6 and 76
ApacheBench instances, and each instance issues 250 concurrent requests for a 45
byte document. The session length was 256 and we used 10 nginx workers. The
second configuration is identical except the ApacheBench instances request 900 byte
documents.
Figure 4.7 shows the average number of requests served, over 5 runs of the
experiment, as a function of the number of client sessions for stock nginx and lwc-
event for both file sizes.
For small documents, lwc-event matches the performance of native nginx up
to 6500 clients. Beyond, the performance of both configurations declines following
the same trend, but the absolute throughput of lwc-event falls below that of nginx









































Figure 4.7: Nginx cumulative throughput in GETs/sec with 10 workers, session
length 256, 45B and 900B documents, increasing number of concurrent clients. Error
bars show standard deviation.
we find that FreeBSD kernel threads, in particular, the interrupt handler thread,
gets CPU bound after 6500 clients, and the CPU consumption of the nginx worker
threads reduces with higher numbers of clients as the nginx worker threads block
waiting for the kernel to demultiplex packets. The lwc-event configuration further
pays an extra cost of lwC switches, which reduces performance compared to stock
nginx. However, given that lwc-event provides session isolation, this is a still a
strong result.
For 900 byte documents, the performance of stock nginx and lwc-event remain
similar until ∼12000 simultaneous clients. Performance of stock nginx is not affected
by increasing numbers of clients: this is because the rate of incoming requests is
lower, which means the kernel threads do not saturate the CPU. With increasing
numbers of clients, eventually the cost of lwC switches, which were amortized over
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serving a larger document, become a measurable factor.
Overall, our results show that using lwCs, it is possible to implement features
such as session isolation and reference monitoring at low cost for both HTTPS and
HTTP sessions, and even in a high-performance server under a challenging workload.
4.4.6 Isolating OpenSSL keys
lwCs provide a particularly effective way to isolate sensitive data from network-
based attacks such as buffer overflows or over-reads. The sensitive data is stored in
a lwC, within the process, such that the network-facing code has no visibility into
pages that store the sensitive data. In this way, unless the kernel is compromised,
the data is guaranteed safe, but access to functions that require the data can be
rapid, using a safe lwC-crossing interface.
As an example, we have isolated parts of the OpenSSL library that manipulate
secret information within Apache and nginx. In our case, the web server certificate
private keys are isolated; note that such a scheme would have rendered attacks such
as Heartbleed completely ineffective since the buffer over-read that Heartbleed relied
on would not have visibility into the memory storing the private keys. We evaluate
this scheme using the following configurations:
In-process LwC Sensitive data is stored in a lwC within the process, following
the pattern from Algorithm 6 in Section 4.3. The network-facing code within the
process has no visibility into the sensitive data; access is through a narrow interface
exported via lwC switch entry points. The isolated lwC has a copy of the original
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process at the time of creation and may call whatever functions are available within
its address space. Our encapsulated OpenSSL library takes advantage of this fact
because the isolated lwC hosts a COW copy of the OpenSSL code and global state
and need not be aware that it is running in a restricted environment. None of the
changes in the sensitive lwC are visible to the network facing code.
We evaluate the cost of providing this isolation by performing SSL handshakes
(TLSv1.2,ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 with 4096 bit keys) with the nginx
web server. The server was configured to spawn four worker processes. We used
ApacheBench with concurrency level 24 and a session length of 1. In our experi-
ments, native nginx required 99.7 seconds to complete ten thousand SSL handshakes,
whereas the configuration with a lwC isolated SSL library required 100.4 seconds.
With lwCs, isolating SSL private keys is essentially free.
Our prototype isolates only the server certificate private key, but not session
keys or other sensitive information. More fine-grained isolation of the OpenSSL
state, such as that described in [36], can be implemented readily using lwCs.
4.4.7 FCGI fast launch
We demonstrate the utility of lwC snapshotting by adding a “fast launch”
capability to a PHP application. When a PHP request is served, a PHP script is read
from disk, compiled by the interpreter, and then executed. During execution, other
PHP files may be included and executed. We modified the PHP 7.0.11 programming
language to add a pagecache call that allows the script to “fast-forward” using
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previous snapshots. Our implementation augments PHP-FPM [89], which functions
as a FCGI server for nginx. Our test application is based on the MVC skeleton
application that is included with the Zend PHP framework [90], which provides
the core functionality for creating database-backed web-based applications such as
blogs.
Before a PHP script performs any computation that depends on request-
specific parameters (e.g., cookie information), the script may invoke the pagecache
call, which implements the snapshot pattern (Algorithm 4). The first time a pagecache
is invoked, we take a snapshot and then revert to it on subsequent requests to the
same URL, effectively jumping execution forward in time. We use a shared memory
segment to store data that must survive a snapshot rollback, including request-
specific data and network connection information.
Our experiments run PHP-FPM with 11 workers. PHP itself includes an
opcode cache (which caches the compilation of each script in memory) and our
results include configurations where the PHP opcode cache is enabled and not.
When combining the opcode cache and the lwC snapshot, we warm up the opcode
cache before taking the snapshot. The results in Table 4.3 are an average of five
runs and overall standard deviation was less than 2%.
stock php lwC php stock php lwC php
no cache no cache cache cache
226.1 615.8 1287.5 1701.4
Table 4.3: Average requests per second over 60 seconds with 24 concurrent requests.
With or without the opcode cache, the lwC snapshot is able to skip over much
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of the initialization of the runtime and whatever PHP execution would otherwise
occur before the pagecache call. This result is remarkable in that it shows lwCs can
provide significant performance benefit to highly optimized end-to-end applications
such as web frameworks, while adding isolation between user requests.
4.5 Conclusion
The abstraction provided by lwCs enables higher security when used for iso-
lation or reference monitoring and better performance when used for memoization
with OS supported snapshots, yet lwCs could not be efficiently implemented with the
abstractions provided by FreeBSD. Instead, an efficient implementation of lwCs re-
quires access to new, low-level abstractions that decouple isolation, execution state,
and privilege separation from the process abstraction. These low-level abstractions
can then be composed in novel ways to create new high-level abstractions, such as
lwCs. To maintain compatibility with traditional process isolation, the only require-
ment is that the low-level abstractions do not expose information that would not
otherwise be available to a calling process. In Section 5.5, we show how lwCs could
be implemented in the null-Kernel architecture, which allows both low and high-level
abstractions to be safely exposed simultaneously by codifying this restriction.
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Chapter 5: The null-Kernel
In this chapter, we present a null-Kernel, a new OS architecture that supports
applications and abstractions with efficiency, usability, and security goals that may
at times be in conflict. The null-Kernel achieves this by providing a safe way to
simultaneously expose both low and high-level OS abstractions simultaneously.
5.1 Introduction
Abstractions imply choice, one that OS designers must confront when de-
signing a programming interface to expose. Traditional monolithic kernel designers
choose a high-level portable interface that necessarily hides many hardware details.
On the other extreme, designs such as the Exokernel optimize for performance and
low-level hardware access. Abstraction choices have further implications in how
easily and quickly new hardware and application models can be supported. In this
chapter, we describe the null-Kernel, a new model for structuring system software
that attempts to relieve OS designers of this choice and enable access to and com-
position of OS interfaces at different levels of abstraction.
The null-Kernel is designed to address the growing need to easily provide
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high-level programming interfaces to new hardware, such as GPUs, crypto/AI ac-
celerators, smart NICs/storage devices, NVRAM etc., and to efficiently support
new application requirements for functionality such as transactional memory, fast
snapshots, fine-grained isolation, etc., that demand new OS abstractions that can
exploit existing hardware in novel and more efficient ways.
At its core, the null-Kernel derives its novelty from being able to support and
compose across components, called Abstract Machines (AMs) that provide program-
ming interfaces at different levels of abstraction. The null-Kernel uses an extensible
capability mechanism to control resource allocation and use at runtime. The abil-
ity of the null-Kernel to support interfaces at different levels of abstraction accrues
several benefits: New hardware can be rapidly deployed using relatively low-level
interfaces; high-level interfaces can easily be built using low-level ones; and applica-
tions can benefit from being able to use interfaces, and compose abstractions using
more than one if necessary, as appropriate.
The null-Kernel capability system can also be used to partition hardware be-
tween different components (AMs) that provide different abstractions. For instance,
the null-Kernel can be used to simultaneously support a traditional OS that pro-
vides a system call interface, and an exokernel that provides low-level access to new
hardware. Such a system could easily enable optimizations not possible now: for
instance, the BSD Socket interface necessarily implies copying incoming data from
kernel to user space memory, and typically an additional copy is incurred when the
data is initially copied from the NIC. Zero copy stacks exist, but do not eliminate the
initial copy. A null-Kernel that combines a BSD-like AM and an exokernel interface
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for Smart NICs can be programmed to assemble incoming TCP segments and copy
them directly into process memory, bypassing the BSD AM entirely. Applications
can use the BSD interface for traditional high-level services while simultaneously
benefiting from a very high performance networking stack.
We describe design principles for AMs that go beyond strict partitioning, and
enable cooperating AMs to provide additional functionality. These design princi-
ples can be used to retrofit existing kernels, allowing applications to simultaneously
use the high-level interface they provide while benefiting from additional access to
low-level hardware features that were previously hidden by the traditional OS. For
instance, cooperating high- and low-level AMs can simultaneously provide virtual
memory (high-level) and access to page-access bits (low-level, currently unavail-
able). Such a facility could be used to implement new primitives (e.g., software
transactional memory) or optimize existing (e.g., garbage collection).
In the next section, we describe the null-Kernel structure, its capability system,
and how interfaces provided by AMs can be composed using the null-Kernel. In
Section 5.3 we discuss how an existing kernel can be retrofitted to interface with an
exokernel, and provide examples of how new types of application primitives such a
hybrid system can support. We discuss related work in Section 2.3.
5.2 The null-Kernel
Figure 5.1 shows a high-level schematic of the null-Kernel. The null-Kernel ar-
chitecture decomposes the system into three components: abstract machines (AMs),
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Figure 5.1: An overview of the null-Kernel showing system components: the null-Kernel,
abstract machines, and callers.
callers, and the null-Kernel itself.
Abstract machines are software layers that provide specific functionality, and
expose a set of operations that callers may invoke. In a traditional OS, the kernel is
the AM, and this set of operations is the system call interface. Callers are processes
or threads, as recognized by the kernel. In a null-Kernel architecture, there may be
other layers of software (i.e., different AMs) that provide different interfaces, which
would also be available to eligible callers, which may include other AMs.
The null-Kernel, shown in green in the figure, controls access to AM operations
by only allowing invocations when the caller presents capabilities with sufficient
access rights. The capability structure supported by the null-Kernel is extensible:
AMs define new capabilities and specify which access rights are required for any
given AM operation. Since the capability system is extensible, the null-Kernel can
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recognize new operations (and indeed complete AMs) at runtime.
null-Kernel Structure Figure 5.1 shows how OS software in the null-Kernel
model is structured. The hardware presents a programming interface, which we term
the Hardware-AM1. The other AMs in the figure export different sets of operations
that ultimately make use of the Hardware-AM. AMs can be layered, e.g., AM-2
is partially built using AM-1’s operations. In a null-Kernel, callers, with proper
capabilities, may invoke operations exported by a “high-level” AM such as AM-2,
or by “low-level” AMs such as AM-0, or any combination simultaneously. This is the
key insight behind the null-Kernel: as long as a caller has proper capabilities, they
may invoke operations at any level of abstraction, and thus the OS architecture
is not confined to one model. More importantly, if the underlying resources are
disjoint, or if the AMs cooperate (as described next), these calls compose, and can
safely be executed in parallel or in any combination.
AMs structured with the null-Kernel capabilities permit many patterns of re-
source access and optimizations that are either cumbersome or impossible otherwise.
These include “bypassing” layers by delegating capabilities and controlled sharing of
resources between “peer” AMs. Next we describe the capability subsystem in more
detail followed by examples demonstrating these access and optimization patterns.
1Obviously, the Hardware-AM is not “abstract” but we (ab)use the term for uniformity.
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5.2.1 null-Kernel Capabilities
In this section, we describe the null-Kernel capability system in more detail.
AMs, including the Hardware-AM, define “objects” and “access rights” on objects.
The null-Kernel capability system is extensible in that it operates over (dynamically
defined) AM objects and rights. Capabilities are unforgeable references to a pair
consisting of an AM object and a set of access rights on that object. Operations
defined by AMs refer to one or more pairs of objects and access rights. For example,
the Hardware-AM may define a memory page as an object, and read and write as
access rights. A DMA operation that copies data onto a page would require the
write access right on that page object. This requirement is reflected to the null-
Kernel as described below; a caller may invoke an operation (DMA-write) only if
they have the capabilities associated with the operation (in our example, the caller
must have a capability that grants the write right to that memory page).
The null-Kernel capability system derives directly from prior work in capabili-
ties [72,91]. Like existing systems, in the null-Kernel, capabilities can be associated
with object, rights pairs, delegated to others, derived to produce weaker capabilities
(by reducing the rights set), and revoked. In the null-Kernel, when a capability is
revoked, all derived capabilities are also revoked. Much like other capability sys-
tems, the basic security of the null-Kernel requires that a principal (a caller or AM)
can only get access to a capability by either being granted the capability explicitly
or deriving it from a stronger capability. In particular, colluders cannot grow their
collective set of capabilities beyond what is explicitly granted to them.
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Extensibility The novelty of null-Kernel capabilities derives from the fact that
null-Kernel itself does not associate capabilities to the operations they guard. This
association is made by AMs and is, therefore, extensible. Specifically, AMs can
define new objects at their level of abstraction (e.g., the Hardware-AM can de-
fine memory pages as objects, whereas a higher-level VM-AM that provides virtual
memory can define address-spaces and memory regions as objects). AMs also de-
fine custom rights on objects, and this set too is extensible at runtime. Again, as
an example, both the Hardware-AM and the VM-AM can define read and write
as rights on their respective objects (physical pages for the Hardware-AM, mem-
ory regions and address spaces for the VM-AM). The operations supported by the
low-level Hardware-AM mirror those of the access rights (the read/write operation
succeeds only if the caller has read/write access to a memory page). The VM-AM
can associate much richer semantics with operations: for example, it may define a
mapReadable function that takes an address space and a memory region as input,
and the caller may only map a memory region into an address space if they have
capabilities that provide write on the address space and read on the memory region.
The null-Kernel provides an API that allows AMs to express capability requirements
for each call. As long as the capabilities are delegated correctly any caller at any
‘layer’ of the system may use operations exported by an AM. The invoked AM main-
tains its correctness as long as the capabilities are checked prior to the operation
being executed.
105
Capability hierarchies and delegation The null-Kernel naturally allows AMs
to build and, in turn, export interfaces based on capabilities received from lower
layers. These exported interfaces (and their associated capabilities) implicitly form
a capability hierarchy. Hierarchical capabilities are different from simple delegation
in which an AM directly grants received capabilities to others. (Delegation is useful
for the layer bypassing model we discuss later.) For both hierarchical and delegated
capabilities, AMs should follow two basic principles to ensure correctness for higher-
layers:
• Logical separation: An AM should give potentially conflicting capabilities
(e.g., write capabilities to the same object) to mutually trusting principals
only (principals who understand each other’s invariants).
• Essential capability hiding: A higher-level AM should not give out any capa-
bility it has on a lower-level AM, if the capability can be used to violate the
higher-level AM’s own invariants.
Capability Checks It is crucial to note that the null-Kernel, as described, is
a schematic for how OSs should be structured. This schematic does not specify
how capability checks are implemented, only that operations across AMs should be
guarded by checks. This lack of specificity of implementation is on purpose since it
provides unconstrained latitude in how (and when) the checks are implemented. For
example, capability checks could be implemented in hardware (using the ISA [47,92],
MMU, processor protection rings [3,72]), with programming language techniques (a
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safe compiler only generates code for capabilities it is provided [69]), using virtual-
ization (guest OSs implement AMs constrained using the hypervisor interface [93]),
and so on. Similarly, capability unforgeability can also be implemented using dif-
ferent mechanisms: EROS [72] protects capabilities using protection rings, whereas
Amoeba [94] uses random placement of capabilities in a sparse address space. Other
systems [95] [96] protect capabilities with cryptography primitives. The null-Kernel
could employ any or all of these methods.
5.2.2 null-Kernel Structures
We conclude this section with two examples of how null-Kernel capabilities can
be used to create interesting optimizations and sharing structures between AMs.
Layer Bypassing Consider a system (Figure 5.2) that exposes both a high-level
filesystem AM (fs-AM) that operates on the level of files and directories, as well
as a low-level disk AM (d-AM) that operates at the level of blocks. The fs-AM
is implemented on top of the d-AM using raw block read/writes exported by the
d-AM.
Most callers may prefer to use the file system through the fs-AM. However,
applications, such as high performance databases, that want low level control over
how data is arranged, may use the d-AM directly. With a null-Kernel, both these
cases can be supported simultaneously by exposing both AMs to callers, subject
to constraints of hierarchical and delegated capabilities. In particular, following







Figure 5.2: A representation of a file system AM built on top of and exposing capabilities
for a disk AM.
the fs-AM capabilities to disjoint disk blocks to ensure that they do not overwrite
the other’s data. Indeed, in existing systems, raw disks or partitions are often
provided exclusively to high performance applications for exactly this reason (and
with exactly this constraint).
A more interesting use-case is that the fs-AM itself can delegate block capa-
bilities it receives from the d-AM to its callers. This would enable applications to
write to file-system managed data blocks directly without going through the fs-AM.
The null-Kernel enables such layer bypassing since it allows any caller with the ap-
propriate capabilities to call any AM (the d-AM in this case). In this case, the
fs-AM must adhere to the principle of “essential capability hiding” by never dele-
gating write capabilities that pertain to file system metadata blocks to guarantee
file system integrity.
108
AM peering The null-Kernel also supports non-hierarchical, peering structures
between AMs. We illustrate this using VM paging as an example. Consider the
virtual memory AM (VM-AM). Upon memory pressure, the VM-AM writes pages
to disk. To accomplish this, we assume that the VM-AM has been delegated write
capabilities to a set of disk blocks by the disk AM (d-AM). The VM-AM uses these
capabilities to write pages to disk as needed. To page these items back in, the VM-
AM invokes an operation in the d-AM that requires a block capability with read
access and a page capability with write access. The d-AM may then asynchronously
write into the page from the block and notify the VM-AM when the operation
has completed. This peer-to-peer interaction between cooperating AMs is natively
supported by the null-Kernel.
5.3 null-Kernel in Practice
In the previous section, we outlined the basic structure of the null-Kernel and
described use cases where the relevant subsystems were written to conform to our
model. Many null-Kernel ideas, however, are applicable to current OSs as well; in
this section, we describe how salient parts of the null-Kernel can be integrated into
production kernels and the types of optimizations this can enable.
Figure 5.3 depicts a standard OS, such as FreeBSD, extended to recognize the
null-Kernel as we describe next. The system also includes a new AM, the EXO
AM, which exports a low-level interface to hardware, similar to that provided by










Figure 5.3: Architecture for retrofitting the null-Kernel into a BSD system to expose
include safe exokernel like AM.
options as to how an EXO AM could co-habit with FreeBSD. One option to give
the EXO AM access to the hardware is to let it run in supervisor mode, alongside
the BSD AM.
Callers in this hybrid system are BSD processes, augmented with capabilities
which can be used to access the EXO AM. Processes (which run in processor ring-
3) calling into the EXO AM must incur a processor ring switch, and hence the
“user-kernel boundary” separates processes from the EXO AM as well.
In this structure, the BSD AM and the EXO AM cooperate, and must share
the hardware capabilities without conflict. For instance, the BSD AM could choose
to not use its hardware capabilities for certain devices. The EXO AM can safely
export its minimal interface and be used as a base for higher level abstractions on
these devices. With more cooperation, the EXO AM could also provide read-only
access to hardware primitives that are used by the BSD AM (e.g., by exporting
110
processor status and memory reference bits). Such hybrid access to high- and low-
level interfaces enables new use patterns that are not possible with either interface
in isolation.
Access to new hardware The EXO AM can provide low-level access to new
hardware such as GPUs, FPGAs, or smart-NICs for which the BSD kernel does not
have support. New devices added to the machine would add additional hardware
AMs to the system. Hardware vendors or kernel developers would then write a thin
abstraction of the hardware AM and expose it via the EXO AM. At this point, the
new hardware could be directly used by processes (with proper capabilities).
New Abstractions The ability to layer AMs would give us the opportunity to
build higher level AMs in terms of the EXO AM. These higher level AMs would offer
different abstractions that might be suitable for the hardware, and each application
that wanted to use the new hardware could choose the AM that best meets its needs.
New abstractions need not be limited to new hardware. For instance, in co-
operation with the BSD AM, the EXO AM could expose hardware features such as
page reference bits in page tables which are usually hidden by the BSD AM. These
tracking bits could be used by applications to augment the BSD VM subsystem and
implement novel features such as efficient software transactional memory (TM) or
fast garbage collection. Currently, a generic software implementation of TM requires
compiler augmentation of every single memory access [97]. This overhead can be
entirely avoided if page reference bit were made available through the EXO AM.
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Simultaneous high- and low-level access The hybrid BSD/EXO AM system
can be used to implement layer bypassing as discussed earlier. The BSD AM could
provide capabilities for disk blocks to processes, which could then use the EXO
AM to implement their own optimizations within the blocks allocated by the BSD
filesystem.
High-level AM over different low-level AMs The hybrid system would allow
different AM’s functionality to enable new use cases. For example, suppose new
hardware in the form of NVRAM storage devices is available, and the EXO AM
exports a low-level block interface to these devices. A higher-layer AM could provide
a memory-mapped file interface to the NVRAM storage, and process logic could
use this facility to implement efficient crash recovery. Here the null-Kernel allows
programmers to use a high-level, well-understood paradigm (memory-mapped files)
to program their application logic, and integrate it with low-level access to new
hardware to implement new functionality (efficient crash recovery).
AM composition The examples above assume that either AMs partition re-
sources, or are able to expose safe “enough” interfaces such that composite services,
that use operations from multiple AMs do not cause deadlock or fault the system
in some other manner. A sufficient condition to ensure both safety and progress is
for each exported AM call to run to completion upon invocation, and for the AM
to maintain all of its safety and progress invariants (e.g., release held locks) prior to
call return (including for calls that it services in parallel). The OS system call inter-
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face maintains such an invariant, but internal kernel interfaces, that assume specific
locking sequences and at times undocumented pre-conditions, do not , thereby mak-
ing kernel modifications fraught with danger. To support composability, AMs could
simply implement the sufficient condition we have described. Articulation of more
precise and efficient criteria is likely feasible and remains part of our future work.
5.4 NVRAM and the null-Kernel
In this section, we will discuss how NVRAM can be supported in a null-Kernel
in a way that makes PTx possible with lower overhead and more flexibility than
offered in existing systems.
PTx, discussed in Chapter 3, acts as an abstraction for efficiently persisting
in-core data structures over NVRAM hardware. To persist efficiently, PTx relied
on newly added Linux support for direct hardware access, which is a form of layer
bypass in terms of the null-Kernel architecture. PTx uses direct access to persist to
NVRAM without the intervention or overhead of other software layers.
Existing POSIX abstractions do not support direct access, so stock Linux was
modified to support direct access via a modified mmap system call. In addition to the
mmap system call, maintainers modified the block device, file system, and virtual
memory system. In this section, we discuss how PTx could have been implemented
in a null-Kernel architecture with lower overhead and less programmer intervention.
Note that kernel subsystems already export interfaces that, in effect, act as
AMs. Interoperability between subsystems depend on programmer discipline: so
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long as the interface is used as expected, the kernel can be extended, but unspoken
contracts and requirements make doing so difficult. We consider those interfaces our
starting point as the AM interface, but note that in a null-Kernel, these interfaces
would be exposed to users and safety and compatibility constraints would be en-
forced by capabilities, rather than the use of convention and programmer discipline.
There are multiple ways to interact with these new AMs, but performance
likely requires that abstractions built in terms of subsystem AMs be executed in su-
pervisor mode. Towards that end, we posit that users have the ability to inject small
programs that are written in a memory safe language and have progress guarantees
that are then injected into the kernel’s address space. These programs could invoke
internal AMs and can expose new abstractions to user space by adding entries to
the system call AM. The enforcement of capabilities and progress guarantees will
be ensured by the invoked AMs and programming language restrictions guarantee
memory safety.
To support direct access, the virtual memory AM must be modified to support
capabilities for NVRAM. This call may be as simple as allocate-nvram-region(size),
which allocates a region of NVRAM pages that may then be mapped into an address
space with a map-region(region,aspace, offset), that maps either NVRAM or
DRAM pages at a given address space and offset. So long as the virtual memory
system does not allocate the same NVRAM regions to multiple callers, this call is
safe and is the only modification necessary in a null-Kernel. To gain direct access to
hardware, a caller requests an NVRAM capability from the virtual memory system
and then requests that this capability be mapped in an address space. This form of
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direct access significantly lowers the bar in supporting new hardware.
However, the form of direct access differs from that offered in Linux, which
makes NVRAM accessible through the filesystem. In this form, the access control
mechanism and namespace for NVRAM is specified by the filesystem abstraction.
With the null-Kernel, we have the flexibility to define a new abstraction that provides
a namespace and access control that may better fit a specific use case, but if the file
system abstraction is useful the null-Kernel architecture can support it through the
mmap call.
To support direct access mmap, we need to consider how file systems would
likely handle the buffer cache in a deconstructed Linux null-Kernel. The buffer
cache is a cache of file contents in system memory that can be mapped or copied
into a process’s address space in response to a read fault over a memory mapped
region. A reasonable null-Kernel file system could either 1., request pages from
the memory AM and copy file contents into those pages whenever requested by the
memory AM in response to a read fault within the memory mapped region or 2.,
fill in a buffer that will be copied into user space by the memory AM in response
to a read fault within the memory mapped region. In the former case, shown in
Figure 5.4, the file system AM can support direct access by providing AM backed
pages to the memory AM in response to page in requests by the memory AM. In
the latter case, both the memory and file system AM would need to be modified to
support direct mapping.
Note that existing in-kernel abstractions were nearly capable enough to sup-


























Figure 5.4: Achieving direct access / layer bypass with a deconstructed linux null-
Kernel
able to make more significant modifications. Furthermore, the abstraction offered
was one size fits all and introduces additional overhead. For instance, the file system
must provide a mapping between file offsets and “blocks,” yet PTx also provides a
mapping between virtual address and NVRAM offsets. A PTx mapping between
virtual addresses and NVRAM physical page offsets would eliminate one layer of
mapping.
It is also important to note that a null-Kernel architecture supports both a
minimal abstraction, where NVRAM pages are directly mapped without interven-
tion of a block device and file system AM, as well as a higher level file system
representation. So long as the memory system adheres to logical separation and
gives out NVRAM capabilities exclusively, both lower and high level abstractions
are available simultaneously.
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5.5 Isolation Abstractions and the null-Kernel
In this section, we will discuss how higher level isolation abstractions, such as
process isolation, can be built in a null-Kernel architecture by defining higher level
constructs that contain and limit access to sets of lower-level capabilities.
The process, a high level abstraction, encapsulates several lower level abstrac-
tions for isolation (address spaces), privilege (user credentials), and execution state
(threads). Processes are a successful abstraction and have worked well for decades,
but increased security demands are leading to new proposals for intraprocess iso-
lation, such as Wedge [36], ERIM [57], and lwCs. Each of these proposals could
be built on top of the high level process abstraction, but performance requirements
necessitate unsafe kernel modifications to access lower level primitives.
Each of the newly proposed intraprocess isolation abstractions make different
choices that impose alternate security, usability, and design sensibilities on their
users, but this is an unnecessary imposition. Each of these systems could have
been simultaneously implemented in a null-Kernel that provided safe access to the
same lower abstractions. This implies that merely changing the composition of
low level abstractions affords significant flexibility in offering different visions for
how to address similar application requirements. We focus on how lwCs would be
implemented in a null-Kernel, but note that Wedge could be built with the same
lower level AMs discussed below, whereas ERIM, which relies on new hardware,
would require an additional modification to the virtual memory AM to provide
access to new isolation instructions.
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In a null-Kernel, abstractions should be decomposed into the lowest level set
of primitives that can be exposed while maintaining compatibility with high level
abstractions. Under this model, the decomposition of the process abstraction would
consist of AMs that provide capabilities and corresponding instructions for manip-
ulating execution state, memory isolation, and privilege.
Execution state and memory isolation are represented with capabilities defined
by the scheduling and virtual memory AM, respectively, whereas privilege is defined
by the set of capabilities that a caller can reach. The scheduling AM represents
execution context with an OS context capability. A scheduling AM exposes instruc-
tions through which a OS context may be have its registers modified or scheduled
to run on a core. Later we will see that these registers may be used to define the
address space in which the OS context executes. Address space and memory region
capabilities are granted by the virtual memory AM and provide memory isolation.
To generalize capabilities, we suggest capabilities be represented by uniformly
distributed pseudo-random integers from a large namespace that cannot be guessed.
Capabilities can thus be stored or passed through registers, address spaces, files,
or sockets. By convention, capabilities may be effectively passed between AMs by
storing capabilities at predetermined locations that have meaning in certain contexts
(e.g., the address space a scheduled OS context executes within is stored in the CR3
register).
In terms of a null-Kernel, a POSIX process is a set of threads (i.e., a OS
context whose CR3 register is constant) that share all capabilities except for the OS
context capability itself. The set of open files and sockets (i.e., the file table) and the
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credentials of the process (e.g., the user id, group id, quotas, etc) are represented
as a collection of capabilities granting access to system resources and are passed
as a set whenever system calls are invoked via the high level system call AM. For
simplicity we will assume the set of capabilities that a OS context may access are
only accessible through a pointer that is stored in a special register we will call the
capability register. Under this assumption, the high level system call AM is always
passed the capability register by the caller.
The lwC AM introduces the lwC abstraction and a set of calls for manipulating
or switching contexts, the primary purpose being to partition a process’s capabilities
into potentially disjoint and mutually untrusted actors. Under the stipulation that
capabilities are only accessible by a OS context through the capability register,
switching lwCs is equivalent to atomically modifying the registers for the OS context
so that switches manifest coroutine semantics and switch the capability register
pointer to another capability set to provide isolation. Critically, the lwC capability
is a derived capability that encloses a capability set that is inaccessible to a OS
context and can only be accessed through the lwC AM. The only way to switch
the capability register to the lwC capability set is through the lwC AM, which is
necessary to provide the higher level security invariants promised by the abstraction.
We will now describe how the lwC AM is implemented in terms of the null-Kernel.
lwCreate The lwC AM exports a new capability type: the lwC. This call takes
a resource specifier and the capability set of the caller. The newly created lwC
contains a capability set that is derived by filtering the passed in capability set with
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the constraints specified by the resource specifier. The newly created context also
contains register values set such that it can resume execution at the point of its
creation when lwSwitch is first called.
lwSwitch Switching an lwC is an operation that replaces the context executing
on an OS context by performing three tasks atomically. First, it saves the state of
the current execution (i.e., saves the register values for the OS context). Second,
it switches the capability register to the capability set enclosed by the target lwC.
And lastly, it changes the OS context registers such that execution resumes where
the target lwC left off.
lwOverlay Capabilities are passed between lwCs during creation and with the
lwOverlay call. With this call, one lwC requests access to capabilities housed in the
capability set of another target lwC. So long as the target lwC has not restricted
the caller, the specified capabilities of the target will be imported into the caller’s
capability set.
lwRestrict The lwRestrict call allows the caller to downgrade a lwC capability
such that it may not be used to overlay a set of specified resources. The set of
restricted resources is associated with the lwC capability internally and consulted
whenever a lwOverlay is attempted.
lwSyscall The lwSyscall allows a more privileged lwC to perform a system call
on behalf of a lesser privileged lwC. lwSyscall works in concert with Capscicum, a
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sandboxing mechanism present in FreeBSD that blocks system calls for sandboxed
processes, which is a form of privilege dropping that we extended for lwCs. The
ability to prohibit system calls is equivalent to requiring system call capabilities
to successfully invoke any calls on the system call AM. Under this equivalence,
lwSyscall may be implemented by creating a new capability set that is the union
of the necessary system call capability and the capability set of the target lwC and
then subsequently using this newly created capability set to invoke the system call.
The lwC AM is a fairly simple composition of lower level AMs that would
likely be exposed in any null-Kernel implementation. This is driven be hardware:
fundamentally, any performant form of isolation will rely on the same underlying
primitives that are available on the hardware (i.e., the lowest level AM). While we
did not show it above, other security proposals such as Wedge are similarly trivial to
implement with the same AMs used above. Where the null-Kernel shines relative to
an exokernel, which would also expose low level primitives, is the use of capabilities
to provide compatibility between abstractions. With a null-Kernel architecture, it is
possible to simultaneously expose lwCs, the Wedge abstraction, process sandboxing
(Seccomp or Capscicum), and the MPK abstraction within the same OS instance.
5.6 Conclusion
The null-Kernel is a new structure for system software that enables abstrac-
tions for efficient access to new hardware and admits new optimizations for existing
hardware. The key enabling feature is its ability to codify the safe co-existence
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of potentially competing abstractions for the same underlying hardware resources.
The null-Kernel achieves this with an extensible capability mechanism and a set of
principles that allow each abstraction to define their own invariants such that both
a high-level abstraction as well as the low-level abstractions that it may encapsulate
may be exposed to users simultaneously.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we described two systems abstractions, PTx and lwCs,
as well as the null-Kernel architecture, a new OS architecture that simplifies the
development of and compatibility of competing abstractions. Our contributions
include the design and implementation of PTx and lwCs, the design of the null-
Kernel architecture, and a discussion of how PTx and lwCs, which both require
access to low and high-level abstractions for performance and functionality, could
be more easily constructed within a null-Kernel architecture. These contributions
support the following thesis: Supporting novel hardware such as NVRAM and new
abstractions like fine-grained isolation while maintaining efficiency, usability, and
security goals, requires simultaneous access to both high-level OS abstractions and
compatible access to their low-level decompositions.
PTx is a high-level abstraction that enables the persistence of standard, un-
modified data structures without the use of a specific programming language or
manual annotation. The performance of PTx is dependent on lower level abstrac-
tions: it relies on direct-access to persistent media (NVRAM), bypassing traditional
memory-mapped file abstractions, and a lower-level virtual memory interface that
provides access to hardware-set page-modified bits. PTx operates on data structures
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within DRAM and optionally tracks modifications through the page-modified bits
before directly and atomically persisting volatile state to an NVRAM-optimized data
structure resident on NVRAM. Our results showed strong performance, PTx often
outperforms Redis and LMDB, which are production systems, as well as manual-
annotation systems proposed by researchers. Further, our results show that coarse-
grained persistence on the order of a second approaches the execution performance
of native DRAM.
lwCs are a new OS abstraction that provides units of isolation, privilege, and
execution state independent of processes and threads. The lwC abstraction is built
on top of lower-level abstractions than are traditionally available and provide new
intra-process isolation functionality while maintaining compatibility with existing
abstractions. In addition to intra-process isolation, lwCs provide fast OS-level snap-
shots and co-routine control transfer between contexts. Our results show that fast
roll-back, compartmentalization of secrets, isolation, and monitoring of user sessions
can be used within production Apache and nginx web servers to improve security
while nearly maintaining or even exceeding the performance of unmodified Apache
and nginx.
The null-Kernel is a new structure for system software that enables abstrac-
tions for efficient access to new hardware and admits new optimizations for ex-
isting hardware. The null-Kernel posits an extensible capability mechanism that
distributes system resources across software that provides programming interfaces
at different layers of abstraction. Equipped with proper capabilities, callers, such
as user processes, can simultaneously program to any or all of these abstractions as
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appropriate. We describe requirements of the null-Kernel’s basic capability mecha-
nism and show how the null-Kernel can be used to implement new abstractions and
optimizations.
6.1 Future Work
PTx and lwCs both address specific problems relating to persisting unmodified
in-core data structures and providing intra-process isolation and snapshots respec-
tively. The null-Kernel, on contrast, suggests a new way to structure a system to
hasten the development of new abstractions. Our work on these systems has raised
some additional research questions about potential extensions to PTx and lwCs, as
well as how the null-Kernel may be implemented in practice.
6.1.1 Extensions to PTx
The basic PTx design can be optimized and extended relatively easily, which
discuss next.
Versioning PTx only stores a single valid snapshot, but can be extended to
store/restore an arbitrary number. Supporting multiple active snapshots would
require PTx to associate a sequence number with each mapped address in the data
header and only free blocks when no retained snapshot refers to the associated se-
quence number. (This design would only accommodate a linear history, i.e. it would
not support forks).
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Paging To support colored regions that exceed the size of DRAM, PTx would have
to support paging. A rudimentary form of paging is implicitly supported already,
in that the OS should page out DRAM pages from the colored region as necessary
when under memory pressure, but this is not ideal. With OS support, the kernel
could unmap unmodified colored pages under memory pressure and fault them back
in from NVRAM when accessed. Similarly, if data blocks in NVRAM were the
size of a page, NVRAM blocks could be mapped as read-only when under memory
pressure.
Optimistic write-ahead When we write from the modified set to NVRAM, we
do so non-destructively. An implication of this is that we could write this data
either in parallel during the commit call, or even between commit calls (using a
free CPU core). The former case is a potential optimization that would be part
of a more advanced implementation. The latter would benefit from hints from the
programmer that modified data in the colored region is unlikely to be written again,
and thus, could be written to NVRAM. Critically, hints should be conservative:
incorrectly hinting that an object will not be rewritten during a transaction does
not affect correctness, but it would lead to unnecessary writes to NVRAM and be
a counter-productive optimization.
Small transactions Transactions whose write set fits into a single blockset can be
committed without using the undo log. Instead, the write of the blockset’s header
serves an an atomic commit point. This optimization works for transactions of
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up to 41 ∗ 256 = 10, 496 bytes, increases performance, and further reduces write
amplification.
6.1.2 Persistent lwCs
Applications may use PTx to persist data structures, but when restarted,
the application itself must re-initialize all other application state and invoke the
PTx restore operation for each colored region. It would reduce startup time and
simplify use if the application could be restarted from the last successful commit
call and resume execution where it left off. This could be achieved if we combined
two abstractions: lwCs and PTx.
lwCs are not currently persistent, but may function as a persistent snapshot
mechanism when combined with PTx and modified slightly. The virtual memory
of the context is easily persisted: whenever lwSwitch is invoked, the memory and
registers of the yielding lwC is optionally persisted to NVRAM via commit and the
target lwC is restored via the restore operation. Similarly, lwCreate would create
a persistent snapshot of the memory of the currently executing lwC. The best way
to handle other lwC state, such as open sockets and file descriptors could be handled
similar to existing checkpointing systems, such as CRIU [98]1, but we suggest that
instead whenever an operation on a restored file is first invoked, a callback is invoked
that may set up and restore the descriptor or socket as appropriate. Sufficient
low-level access to the process file table that allows alternate file operations to be
1CRIU itself functions by the selective exposure of low-level abstractions for querying and
setting process state, such as socket state.
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associated with any given descriptor makes this possible. This flexibility would
allow file descriptor restoration to be done in an application specific way, whether it
attempt to restore network connections, replay the results of a previous invocation
(e.g., in testing or debugging), or invalidate the descriptor. In some cases, such as
preserving application histories, active connections may never need to be restored,
whereas in others connection end-points may have moved and a new connection may
need to be established.
lwC snapshots can be used to checkpoint and restore state, but they can also be
used to build an application’s history, which would be useful for auditing, debugging,
and other contexts where history may want to resumed at arbitrary points, such
as fuzzing [99]. The history of an application (or context) would be collected by
periodically invoking lwCreate and proceeding with the execution. Due to the
deduplication built into PTx, each snapshot would be relatively small.
6.1.3 Implementing a null-Kernel
Monolithic kernels already have well defined interfaces that are available for
extending the kernel with a kernel module. Modules, which execute with full privi-
lege, are intended to use these interfaces but they may call any kernel symbol and
read or write arbitrary regions in the kernel’s address space. Kernel modules work
because they are constrained by convention to only call symbols in predetermined
ways and not read or write memory for which they should not have access. However,
if the constraints that safe modules generally follow can be codified with capabili-
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ties, the interface exposed to kernel modules is a natural starting point for exposing
lower-level AMs in a manner consistent with a null-Kernel.
Wrapping these interfaces with capability checks and exposing them via the
system call interface would provide the functionality we desire, but performance
would likely be unacceptable. High-level AMs built in terms of these low-level AMs
may require many calls to the lower-level AMs to represent a single higher level
abstraction. If each call to the lower-level AMs requires a switch into and out of
supervisor mode, high performance higher-level abstractions could not be built that
are compositions of many calls to the lower-level AMs without inducing significant
overhead. Instead, we propose giving users the ability to inject into the kernel new
abstractions that are written in a restricted language that provides memory safety
and guarantees that capability checks are performed.
We have begun extending FreeBSD to act more like a null-Kernel and expose
lower and higher-level abstractions simultaneously. We have provided lower-level
AMs for virtual memory and OS tasks and allow users to access this via a safe
subset of the Rust programming language that executes within supervisor mode.
Significant work remains to fulfill the full null-Kernel vision, though even a minimal
set of lower-level abstractions enables new higher-level such as lwCs and PTx, as
discussed in Section 5.5 and Section 5.4 respectively. Working from a monolithic
kernel, new hardware and existing abstractions can be safely decomposed and made
available to users with the aide of proper capability checks on an incremental basis.
129
6.2 Concluding Thoughts
Changing application requirements and the accelerating pace of hardware ad-
vances increase the needed rate of iteration for OS abstractions. Increasing security
requirements have driven the need for abstractions that promote greater security
and isolation. A raft of new security proposals, including lwCs, Capsicum [100],
Pledge [101], ERIM [57], and many others have been proposed in recent years. Some
of these systems have been adopted, but often when adopted, they are adopted hap-
hazardly. Owing to the fact that we still lack a unified mechanism to enable the
adoption of new abstractions, many compelling proposals are not adopted or are
only adopted haphazardly and with heroic effort. Critically, many of these systems
rely on the same lower-level abstractions, even though they make different trade-
offs and design decisions that may suit different kinds of applications. Systems for
managing NVRAM, such as PTx, tell a similar story. We have a raft of new pro-
posals, none of which are the best for all circumstances, but all of which rely on the
same fundamental low-level abstractions. It would be better to expose to users the
low-level abstractions alongside the high-level abstractions that depend on them.
When new hardware is introduced, the lowest-level abstraction possible should be
exposed. Whenever a higher-level abstraction is offered, the lower-level abstractions
upon which it is built should be left accessible, with safety provided by following
the principles and structure of the null-Kernel. This vision for future systems de-
velopment will speed the pace of innovation by providing a low-level substrate upon
which new abstractions may always be built, without eliminating the portability
130
that time-tested higher-level abstractions provide.
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